Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., a Utah limited liability company v. ASC Utah, Inc., a Delaware corporation : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2010
Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., a Utah limited
liability company v. ASC Utah, Inc., a Delaware
corporation : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David M. Wahlquist; Rod N. Andreason; Ryan B. Frazier; Kirton & McConkie; Attorneys for
Appellant.
John R. Lund; Kara L. Pettit; Snow, Christensen, and Martineau; John P. Ashton; Clark K. Taylor;
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Wolf Mountain Resorts v. ASC Utah, No. 20100342 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2314
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
ASC UTAH, INC., a Delaware corporation, 
Defendant/Appellee 
Appellate Case No. 20100342-CA 
Trial Court Case No. 070500485 
(ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED) 
On Appeal from an Order Denying Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C.'s Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Granting ASC Utah, Inc.'s Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment by the Third Judicial District Court, Silver Summit District, 
The Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
John R. Lund 
Kara L. Pettit 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
John P. Ashton 
Clark K. Taylor 
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0340 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
David M. Wahlquist (Bar No. 3349) 
RodN. Andreason (Bar No. 8853) 
Ryan B. Frazier (Bar No. 9007) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
tnAHAPP
^TB COURTS 
* » 2 6 2010 
4829-3160-1159.1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
ASC UTAH, INC., a Delaware corporation, 
Defendant/Appellee 
Appellate Case No. 20100342-CA 
Trial Court Case No. 070500485 
(ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED) 
On Appeal from an Order Denying Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C.'s Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Granting ASC Utah, Inc.'s Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment by the Third Judicial District Court, Silver Summit District, 
The Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
John R. Lund 
Kara L. Pettit 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
John P. Ashton 
Clark K. Taylor 
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0340 
David M. Wahlquist (Bar No. 3349) 
Rod N. Andreason (Bar No. 8853) 
Ryan B. Frazier (Bar No. 9007) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
4829-3160-1159 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 1 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 4 
ISSUES PRESENTED 4 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 8 
A. Nature of the Case 8 
B. Course of Proceedings 9 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court 9 
D. Statement of Facts 10 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 14 
ARGUMENT 15 
I. UNDER THE PLAIN TERMS OF THE LEASEHOLD MORTGAGE, THE 
TALISKER PURCHASE WAS AN UNEXCUSED EVENT OF DEFAULT. 
15 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING A "LACK OF CLARITY" 
STANDARD FOR REFORMATION 16 
III. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY REFORMED THE LEASEHOLD 
MORTGAGE 18 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that Unilateral Mistake Did Not Occur. 
18 
B. ASCU Failed to Plead Mistake, Let Alone "With Particularity." 19 
C. ASCU Failed to Prove Mutual Mistake, Let Alone by Clear and 
Convincing Evidence 20 
D. The Trial Court Erred in Sua Sponte Holding that Mutual Mistake Had 
Occurred 21 
CONCLUSION 36 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 37 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 38 
i 
4829-3160-1159 1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Am. Interstate Mortg. Corp. v. Edwards, 2002 UT App 16 ^ j 12, 41 P.3d 1142 6, 8 
Am. Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996) 5 
Ashworthv. Charlesworth, 231 P.2d 724, 727 (Utah 1951) 19 
Bown v. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292, 295 (Utah 1984) 19 
Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770, 772 (Utah 1985) 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 37 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 19, 100 P.3d 1177 4 
Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2004 UT App 436, \ 1, 104 P.3d 
646 4 
Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549, 552 (Utah 1984) 18, 27 
Dixon Bldg, LLC v. Jefferson, 2010 UT App 34, \ 7, 227 P.3d 266 7 
Embassy Group v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 6,8 
England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340, 343 (Utah 1997) 24 
Ervin v. Lowe's Cos., 2005 UT App 463, p , 128 P.3d 11 8 
Gallegos ex rel. Rynes v. Dick Simon Trucking, Inc., 2004 UT App 322 ffif 8-9, 110 P.3d 
710 6 
Greener v. Greener, 212 P.2d 194, 204 (Utah 1949) 20 
Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d 1, 5-6 (Utah 1989) 19 
Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52,U 10, 48 P.3d 235 7 
Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975) 28 
Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613,615 (Utah 1982) 28 
Janke v. Beckstead, 332 P.2d 933, 934 (Utah 1950) 28 
Jensen v. Manila Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, 565 P.2d 63, 
64 (Utah 1977) 29 
Juricic v. Autozone, Inc., 2010 UT App 109, 1 5 n.l, 232 P.3d 1088 23 
Klas v. Van Wagoner, 829 P.2d 135, 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 5 
Mabey v. Kay Peterson Const. Co., 682 P.2d 287, 289 22 
Mackv. UtahDept. of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, If 14,221 P.3d 194 21 
Neiderhauser Bldrs. & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) 7 
R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2004 UT 48,17, 100 P.3d 1159 
6 
Robert Langston, Ltd. v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 25 
Sacklerv. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995) 8 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) 4 
The Cantamar, L.L.C v. Champagne, 2006 UT App 321, % 38, 142 P.3d 140 24 
Thompson v. Smith, 620 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah 1980) 19 
Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666, 670 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 18, 25,29 
ii 
4829-3160-1159 1 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103 (2009) 4 
Other Authorities 
45 Am. Jur. Reformation of Instruments § 113 28 
Rules 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(5) 21 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(h) 21 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(a)-(c) 9 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c) 3, 7,26,28 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(c) 21 
UTAH R CIV. P. 9(b) 22 
iii 
4829-3160-1159 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an appeal of the trial court's decision on cross-motions for summary 
judgment. Plaintiff Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C. ("Wolf Mountain") moved for partial 
summary judgment, and Defendant ASC Utah, Inc. ("ASCU") filed its cross-motion. 
The trial court held, and the parties agreed, that: (1) the contract at issue, a Leasehold 
Mortgage, was unambiguous; (2) the sale of ASCU to a third party was an "event of 
default" under the Leasehold Mortgage's "due-on-sale clause," absent the application of 
an exception; and (3) the Due-On-Sale Clause states that it is to be "strictly construed." 
The parties' dispute centers on the Second Exception to the Due-On-Sale Clause. 
That provision excludes from the "events of default" 
any transfer of all or substantially all of Mortgagee's [Wolf Mountain's] 
rights in and to the development currently known as The Canyons 
(including, without limitation, all of Mortgagee's [Wolf Mountain's] 
interest as tenant under the Ground Lease and the Mortgaged Estate) 
whether effected by stock or asset sale, provided that such transfer shall be 
expressly subject to each and every one of the liens, rights and interests of 
the Mortgagee under this Leasehold Mortgage. 
(Exh. B at Tf 4. A). Wolf Mountain testified that it specifically negotiated this provision so 
that a sale of a controlling interest in ASCU was not an "event of default" when Wolf 
Mountain's rights in The Canyons were also concurrently sold, so long as such transfer 
was subject to all of Wolf Mountain's obligations and rights under the Leasehold 
Mortgage. 
However, ASCU has argued that the text of the Second Exception should be 
altered to reflect what it asserted was the "only logical" way that the Second Exception 
1 
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should have been written - i.e., to exclude from the "events of default" specific sales of 
ASCU's interests, not Wolf Mountain's. 
Although it sought what was, in reality, a reformation of the Second Exception, 
ASCU did not meet the requirements for reformation. ASCU did not argue, let alone 
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, either "mutual mistake" by both parties or its 
own "unilateral mistake" and fraud or inequitable conduct by Wolf Mountain. In fact, 
ASCU did not even plead "mistake" as an affirmative defense in its Answer, let alone 
plead it with particularity, as required by Rule 9. Thus, under Rule 12(h), that defense is 
waived. 
Nevertheless, the trial court held sua sponte that, under its new "lack of clarity" 
standard, the Second Exception should be reformed. (Exh. A at 16-19). In the 
alternative, the trial court held that "some type of equitable formation is allowed," and 
that some type of "mutual mistake" must have occurred "to the extent that is necessary to 
accomplish this type of reformation." {Id. at 20). Although the court conceded that such 
was "not a traditional 'mutual mistake,'" it held that the terms of the Leasehold Mortgage 
showed that ASCU's proposed reformation of the Second Exception was the writing that 
fit the purposes of most leasehold mortgages. {See id.). 
However, Utah courts do not recognize a "lack of clarity" standard for reforming 
contracts. In fact, absent fraud, courts are extremely reluctant to intervene in a freely-
negotiated, fully-executed written contract among sophisticated businesspersons and 
change that contract's terms; they only do so under specific circumstances of "unilateral 
mistake" or "mutual mistake." Parties seeking reformation must plead "mistake" with 
2 
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particularity and prove such by clear and convincing evidence. But ASCU did not even 
refer to "mistake" in its summary judgment memoranda, let alone plead it in its Answer. 
The trial court did not identify how ASCU's proposed reformation was agreed to by the 
parties, but then not memorialized in the Leasehold Mortgage. Thus, the Second 
Exception should not be changed to reflect what ASCU now claims to be that provision's 
"true purpose." Instead, it should be interpreted according to its plain terms, just as they 
were after the parties executed the Leasehold Mortgage after extensive negotiation and 
representation by competent legal counsel. 
In addition, in deciding to reform the Leasehold Mortgage, the trial court stated 
that it was not reviewing extrinsic evidence; it was only considering the terms of the 
Leasehold Mortgage itself However, the trial court repeatedly supported its decision to 
reform the Leasehold Mortgage by citing agreements, depositions, and other statements 
outside of the Leasehold Mortgage that ASCU had proposed - including its unsworn 
"declaration" - while simultaneously ignoring sworn statements and other evidence 
provided by Wolf Mountain. This was a failure to obey Rule 56(c)'s requirement to 
consider "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits" in rendering summary judgment, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. UTAH R. Civ. P. 56(c). Furthermore, extrinsic 
evidence must be considered in the context of reformation due to mistake, since by 
definition, the terms of the contract may not show what the parties actually intended. 
In sum, ASCU has failed to plead or prove "mistake" - that the Second Exception 
did not reflect what the parties intended - and has in fact waived such defense. Thus, this 
3 
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Court should hold that the trial court improperly reformed the Leasehold Mortgage, the 
sale of ASCU was an "event of default," and Wolf Mountain's motion for partial 
summary judgment should be granted. However, at a minimum, this Court should hold 
that the trial court erred in refusing to consider Wolf Mountain's affidavit, deposition, 
and other evidence in determining whether "mistake" occurred warranting reformation, 
and thus reverse the trial court's decision granting summary judgment to ASCU. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court's jurisdiction arises under Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103 (2009). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue #1: Whether the trial court erred in applying a "lack of clarity" standard for 
the reformation of the parties' Leasehold Mortgage. 
Standard of Review. 
"[WJhether the trial court applied the proper legal standard is a question of law 
that is reviewed for correctness." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 19, 100 P.3d 1177 
(citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)); see also Colosimo v. Roman 
Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2004 UT App 436, t 7, 104 P.3d 646 ("The 
articulation of a proper legal standard is a question of law, which we review for 
correctness."). 
Preservation in the Trial Court: The standard for reformation was the subject of 
Wolf Mountain's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 254-257), and of the trial court's 
decision below {See the trial court's Ruling and Order dated March 26, 2010 at 16-17 and 
19-20, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A"; see also R. 299-321). 
4 
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Issue #2: Whether the trial court erred in holding that a "mutual mistake" had 
occurred in the parties' drafting of the Second Exception to the Leasehold Mortgage's 
Due-On-Sale Clause. 
Standard of Review. A trial court's determination as to whether a "mutual 
mistake" has occurred is a "question[] of law that we will review for correctness." Am. 
Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. CCIMechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996); see also 
Klas v. Van Wagoner, 829 P.2d 135, 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (reviewing the court's 
determination of "unilateral mistake" as a legal conclusion, which was "accorded no 
particular deference; we review them for correctness."). In addition, "If a trial court 
interprets the plain language of a written contract as a matter of law, 'we accord its 
construction no particular weight and review its actions under a correction-of-error 
standard.' " Am. Interstate Mortg. Corp. v. Edwards, 2002 UT App 16 If 12, 41 P.3d 
1142 (quoting Embassy Group v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). 
Preservation in the Trial Court: This standard for reformation was the subject of 
Wolf Mountain's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 254-257), and of the trial court's 
decision below (Exh. A at 16-20). 
Issue #3: Whether the trial court erred in declining to consider extrinsic 
evidence provided by Wolf Mountain in rendering summary judgment against Wolf 
Mountain on the ground of mutual mistake. 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to exclude a certain type of evidence 
is reviewed for correctness, affording no deference to the trial court. See Gallegos ex rel. 
Rynes v. Dick Simon Trucking, Inc., 2004 UT App 322 ffif 8-9, 110 P.3d 710. 
5 
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Furthermore, "[i]n the context of a summary judgment motion, we likewise employ a 
correctness standard and 'view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party."' R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc. v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2004 UT 48,1j 7, 100 P.3d 1159 (quoting Hermansen v. Tasulis, 
2002 UT 52,H 10, 48 P.3d 235). Summary judgment shall be granted only if "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and [if] the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law." UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c). In determining whether the trial court correctly 
found that there were no genuine issues of material fact, the Court reviews the trial 
court's conclusions of law for correctness, including its conclusion that there are no 
material fact issues. See Neiderhauser Bldrs. & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 
1196 (Utah CtApp. 1992). 
Preservation in the Trial Court: The standard for reformation was the subject of 
Wolf Mountain's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 254-257). In its Ruling and Order, 
the trial court newly decided not to consider any extrinsic evidence (Exh. A at 20, 21). 
Issue #4: Whether the trial court erred in reforming the Second Exception to the 
Due-On-Sale Clause in the parties' Leasehold Mortgage. 
Standard of Review. 
This Court "review[s] a district court's conclusions of law for correctness, 
affording the trial court no deference." Dixon Bldg., LLC v. Jefferson, 2010 UT App 34, 
f 7, 227 P.3d 266. This Court likewise accords no deference to the trial court regarding 
its "resolution of the legal issues presented[J and [it] determines only whether the trial 
court erred in applying the governing law." Ervin v. Lowe's Cos., 2005 UT App 463, ^  8, 
6 
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128 P.3d 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court also reviews a trial court's 
interpretation of a contract for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. See 
Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995). "If a trial court interprets the plain 
language of a written contract as a matter of law, 'we accord its construction no particular 
weight and review its actions under a correction-of-error standard.' " Am. Interstate 
Mortg. Corp. v. Edwards, 2002 UT App 16 Tf 12, 41 P.3d 1142 (quoting Embassy Group 
v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). 
Preservation in the Trial Court: This issue was the subject of Wolf Mountain's 
Motion (R. 254-257), and the trial court's decision below (Exh. A at 16-20). 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a)-(c): 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service 
of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for 
summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any 
time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and 
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(a)-(c). 
7 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Wolf Mountain leases real property located in Summit County to ASCU pursuant 
to a certain "Ground Lease." The Ground Lease includes property on which The 
Canyons Resort is located. Among its obligations to Wolf Mountain, ASCU is required 
to deliver certain real property and development rights to Wolf Mountain (the "100 Unit 
Obligation"). To secure the 100 Unit Obligation, ASCU, as the "Mortgagee," executed a 
Leasehold Mortgage in favor of Wolf Mountain, the "Mortgagor." Paragraph 4. A of the 
Leasehold Mortgage provides that it is an "event of default" thereunder when a 
controlling ownership in ASCU is sold to a third party (the "Due-On-Sale Clause"). 
A third party, Talisker Canyons Finance Co., LLC ("Talisker"), purchased a 
controlling interest in ASCU. Accordingly, Wolf Mountain declared a default under the 
Leasehold Mortgage and filed this litigation. ASCU asserts that the second-listed 
exception to the Due-On-Sale Clause (the "Second Exception") applies to it, relieving it 
of any default under the Leasehold Mortgage. ASCU contends that it does not make 
sense for the Second Exception to be applied in favor of Wolf Mountain, despite the fact 
that the Second Exception specifically states that it refers to Wolf Mountain - not ASCU. 
Wolf Mountain asserts that the Second Exception was intended to mean exactly what it 
says, that it was intended to avoid a default if Wolf Mountain's interest in The Canyons 
were sold, that it was extensively discussed and negotiated by the parties and their legal 
counsel, and that the parties agreed that the paragraph containing it would be strictly 
8 
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construed. Both parties agree that the terms of the Leasehold Mortgage are 
unambiguous. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Following discovery, Wolf Mountain filed its Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, seeking an order declaring that (i) the Leasehold Mortgage that is the subject 
of this litigation is unambiguous and fully enforceable as written; and (ii) therefore, the 
sale of all of the outstanding stock of ASCU to Talisker constitutes an Event of Default 
pursuant to Paragraph 4(A). (R. 184-192). ASCU then filed its Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. 193-195). On March 22, 2010, the trial court held a hearing 
regarding those two motions. (Exh. A at 1). 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court. 
On March 26, 2010 the district court issued its Ruling and Order, denying Wolf 
Mountain's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting ASCU's Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (Exh. A at 21). The trial court held that the Leasehold Mortgage 
was an unambiguous, integrated contract. (See id, at 11-13). The court ordered that 
either under a "lack of clarity" standard or the law of reformation, the Second Exception 
to the Due-On-Sale Clause of the Leasehold Mortgage should be reformed to replace 
Wolf Mountain, the "Mortgagor," with ASCU, the "Mortgagee," on the ground that 
"some type of reformation" was required based on something that was "not a traditional 
'mutual mistake.'" (Id. at 16-18) The trial court also held that the sale of ASCU to 
Talisker, after the Leasehold Mortgage was reformed, was no longer an "event of 
9 
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default" under the Leasehold Mortgage. (Id. at 21). The trial court stated that it declined 
to consider extrinsic evidence in rendering its decision. (See id). 
D. Statement of Facts. 
In 1997, pursuant to a certain "Ground Lease," Wolf Mountain leased the real 
property (the "Property") underlying what is now known as "The Canyons Ski Resort" to 
ASCU. (R. 218 at Exh. 5 at ^ 4; R. 218 at Exh. 1). The Property includes both parcels 
that Wolf Mountain owns and parcels that Wolf Mountain leases - which Wolf Mountain 
then sub-leases to ASCU. (R. 218 at Exh. 5 at \ 4; R. 218 at Exh. 1 at § 1.02). One 
parcel leased by Wolf Mountain and then subleased to ASCU is a property called 
"Section 2?" which Wolf Mountain leased from the School Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration ("SITLA") under the "SITLA Lease." (R. 218 at Exh. 1 at § 1.02 and its 
Sch. A; R. 218 at Exh. 11). Under the Ground Lease, ASCU is required to pay Wolf 
Mountain annual rent payments of four percent (4%) of ASCU's gross sales and lodging 
revenues at The Canyons Ski Resort, eleven percent (11%) of construction costs of 
certain development on the Property, and certain one-time payments when the Resort 
achieves specific numbers of paid skier visits in the year. (R. 218 at Exh. 5 at j^ 4; R. 218 
at Exh. 1 at §§3.01, 25.01, 25.04). 
In 1999, Pursuant to a Second Amendment to the Ground Lease, ASCU became 
obligated to grant to Wolf Mountain fee simple title to particular land on which ASCU 
had obtained approval to develop one hundred (100) Hotel/Lodging Units (the "100 Unit 
Obligation"). (R. 218 at Exh. 5 at ffif 5-6). ASCU was also obligated to secure this 
obligation by providing a mortgage to Wolf Mountain. (See id.). ASCU did not do so for 
10 
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several years. (R. 218 at Exh. E at ffi[ 7-8). After Wolf Mountain filed a Notice of 
Default due to this failure, on November 23, 2005, ASCU, as the "Mortgagor," provided 
a certain Leasehold Mortgage to Wolf Mountain, the "Mortgagee." (Id.; a copy of the 
Leasehold Mortgage is attached hereto as Exhibit "B"). 
Subparagraph 4. A. of the Leasehold Mortgage states, in part: 
Any of the following shall be an event of default ("Event of Default"): 
(iv) any sale, transfer, conveyance or assignment of all or any portion of, or 
any interest in, the Mortgaged Estate, or the sale, transfer, conveyance or 
assignment of any controlling ownership interest in and to the 
Mortgagor [ASCU] (which shall not include transfer of controlling 
ownership interest in the Mortgagor's parent or shareholders). 
(Exh. B at f^ 4.A.) (emphasis added). This paragraph is referred to as the "Due-
On-Sale Clause." Subparagraph 4.A. of the Leasehold Mortgage further states: "The 
terms of this Paragraph A. shall be strictly construed . . . ." (Exh. B at ^ 4.A.) 
(emphasis added). 
On the date that ASCU executed the Leasehold Mortgage, American Skiing 
Company, Inc. ("ASC") owned a controlling interest in ASCU. (R. 218 at Exh. E at 1f 
27). Subsequently, ASC entered into an agreement to sell to Talisker Canyons Finance 
Co., LLC ("Talisker") its controlling interest in ASCU (the "Talisker Purchase"). {Id.). 
ASC has since closed the Talisker Purchase and no longer owns a controlling interest in 
ASCU. (Id; Exh. A at 13 ("The default at issue here is whether ASCU sold its stock or 
assets. It did beyond dispute." ). 
Wolf Mountain asserted that the Talisker Purchase was an "event of default" under 
the Leasehold Mortgage. (Exh. B at If 4.A). ASCU responded by asserting that the 
11 
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Talisker Purchase was not an "event of default" because it met the terms of the second 
listed exception in the Due-On-Sale Clause (the "Second Exception"). (Id). However, 
the Second Exception states that the sale of a controlling interest in ASCU is not an 
"event of default" when Wolf Mountain's rights in The Canyons are also concurrently 
sold. Specifically, that provision states that no "event of default" occurs upon: 
(ii) any transfer of all or substantially all of Mortgagee's [Wolf 
Mountain's] rights in and to the development currently known as The 
Canyons (including, without limitation, all of Mortgagee's [Wolf 
Mountain's] interest as tenant under the Ground Lease and the Mortgaged 
Estate) whether effected by stock or asset sale, provided that such transfer 
shall be expressly subject to each and every one of the liens, rights and 
interests of the Mortgagee under this Leasehold Mortgage 
(Exh. B at f 4.A). Wolf Mountain is indisputably the "Mortgagee" in the Leasehold 
Mortgage. (Exh. B at 1). Thus, this provision explicitly states that the sale of a 
controlling interest in ASCU is not an "event of default" if it also concurrently transfers 
Wolf Mountain's rights in The Canyons, as long as such transfer is subject to all of Wolf 
Mountain's obligations and rights under the Leasehold Mortgage. (Exh. B at ^ 4.A). 
Wolf Mountain specifically negotiated for and received the Due-on-Sale Provision 
of the Leasehold Mortgage because it was critical to Wolf Mountain that ASCU be 
specifically obligated to provide the 100 Units, water and infrastructure to Wolf 
Mountain. (R. 218 at Exh. 5 at ^f 16-17 and Exhs. 7-10). The Due-On-Sale Clause was 
particularly important to Wolf Mountain in light of the pending insolvency of ASCU's 
then-parent company, ASC. (R. 218 at Exh. 5 at 117). In June 2007, American Skiing 
Company approved and announced a plan of dissolution and liquidation pursuant to 
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which the company would go out of business and liquidate all of its assets, including 
several ski resorts. (See id). 
Prior to the execution of the Leasehold Mortgage, ASCU's counsel sought to 
revise the terms of the Due-On-Sale Clause; however, Wolf Mountain did not agree to all 
of ASCU's revisions. (R. 218 at Exh. 5 at ffi[ 14-15, 18-22 and Exhs. 7-10). Wolf 
Mountain rejected a change proposed by ASCU that would have broadly expanded the 
Second Exception. (See id.). Wolf Mountain's position was that it was entitled to a 
"due-on-sale" clause with only a limited exception wherein ASCU and Wolf Mountain 
entered into a joint transaction to sell both of their interests in the resort and its 
underlying lands to a third party. (See id.). Wolf Mountain's counsel testified that the 
Due-On-Sale Clause appeared in the executed Leasehold Mortgage as Wolf Mountain 
intended and the parties agreed. (R. 218 at Exh. 5 at fflf 4-6)). 
Nevertheless, ASCU has asserted that the term "Mortgagee" was really intended to 
mean "ASCU," the "Mortgagor," and that the Second Exception to the Leasehold 
Mortgage should be changed to state that it refers to the sale of ASCU's interests, not 
Wolf Mountain's. (R. 196 et seq). 
On March 26, 2010, the trial court denied Wolf Mountain's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, granted ASCU's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and held 
that the Leasehold Mortgage should be reformed according to ASCU's request on the 
ground of "mutual mistake," despite the fact that ASCU had never plead "mistake," had 
waived "mistake" as a defense, had not even argued "mistake" as a ground for reforming 
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the Leasehold Mortgage, and had not proven "mistake" by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the district court's decision denying Wolf Mountain's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The undisputed facts show that the Talisker 
Purchase was an "event of default," as defined in the Leasehold Mortgage. ASCU has 
failed to plead, let alone prove, any "mistake" warranting reformation. The Leasehold 
Mortgage stands as it was written, negotiated extensively by competent counsel. The 
parties even agreed that the relevant provision would be "strictly construed." Therefore, 
this Court should reverse the trial court's decision and grant summary judgment on behalf 
of Wolf Mountain. 
This Court should also reverse the trial court's decision granting ASCU's Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment and reforming the Leasehold Mortgage. The trial court 
erred in applying a "lack of clarity" standard for reformation. None such exists. The trial 
court alternatively held, sua sponte, that "mutual mistake" had occurred "to the extent it 
was necessary" to meet the prerequisites for reformation; but ASCU did not plead 
"mistake" as a defense, and therefore waived it, and did not even argue "mutual mistake," 
let alone prove it by "clear and convincing evidence." 
The trial court held that the Leasehold Mortgage was integrated and unambiguous 
- which no party disputes. However, the trial court also held that as a result, it need not 
consider extrinsic evidence; it could determine whether reformation was proper by 
examining only the terms of the Leasehold Mortgage. However, despite that statement, 
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the trial court considered several items of extrinsic evidence and adopted ASCU's 
unsworn interpretation regarding them. Such was improper on summary judgment, and 
particularly where the trial court was attempting to determine whether the parties' actual 
intent was memorialized in the written agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UNDER THE PLAIN TERMS OF THE LEASEHOLD MORTGAGE, THE 
TALISKER PURCHASE WAS AN UNEXCUSED EVENT OF DEFAULT. 
As the trial court held, and ASCU has not appealed, the Talisker Purchase of 
ASCU was an "event of default" under the Due-On-Sale Clause of the Leasehold 
Mortgage unless ASCU meets an exception under Paragraph 4. A of that agreement: 
The default at issue here is whether ASCU sold its stock or assets. It did 
beyond dispute. That is an event of default, unless one of the exceptions 
applies. 
(Exh. A at 13) (emphasis added). 
In addition, there is no dispute that ASCU did not meet the first exception to the 
Due-On-Sale Clause. (Exh. B at U 4.A(iv)(i)). Furthermore, ASCU does not meet the 
plain terms of the Second Exception to the Due-On-Sale Clause because the Talisker Sale 
did not "transfer all or substantially all of Wolf Mountain's rights in and to the 
development currently known as The Canyons." (Exh. B at ^ 4.A(iv)(ii)). 
Furthermore, the Due-On-Sale Clause specifically states that u[t]he terms of this 
Paragraph A. shall be strictly construed." (Exh. B at If 4.A). This raises the level of 
proof that ASCU is required to provide even higher. There is no evidence that the parties 
did not fully and fairly negotiate this provision. 
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Therefore, unless ASCU has pleaded and proven by clear and convincing evidence 
that a "mutual mistake" occurred requiring that the Second Exception be reformed, this 
Court should "strictly construe" the Due-On-Sale Clause and hold that the Talisker 
Purchase is an unexcused "event of default" under the Leasehold Mortgage and reverse 
the trial court's decision denying Wolf Mountain's motion for summary judgment. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING A "LACK OF CLARITY" 
STANDARD FOR REFORMATION. 
The trial court ruled that, using its equitable powers, it could change the 
terms of the Leasehold Mortgage under a "lack of clarity" standard. The court 
stated: 
The court does not believe that it is indeed involved in a 
reformation as that concept is normally meant. The court finds and 
concludes, FROM THE ENTIRETY OF THE CONTRACT ON ITS 
FACE, that such was intended and the error . . . was the product of 
confusion or a scrivener's error. 
Whether this error is couched in terms of mistake and 
reformation or simply couched in terms of clarity of the contract with a 
minor typographical error the result is the same to the court. 
Where the contract as written expresses an unintended meaning or 
creates an uncontemplated right, equity provides that it can be made to 
conform to the parties [sic] intent. . . . 
. . . . The court recognizes that perhaps this is a type of reformation, as 
ASCU argued, but it is in equity simply stating the contract as the 
document itself clearly intended. 
Some type of equitable reformation is thus allowed and required, 
[TJhere is no ambiguity on the face of the document except as created by a 
scrivener's error, and it created not ambiguity but lack of clarity . . . . 
(Exh. A at 16-17, 19-20) (allcaps emphasis in original, bold and italics emphasis added). 
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Trial courts certainly have equitable powers. However, even under such powers, 
courts cannot change the terms of a contract simply because they believe the contract 
"lacks clarity." (Id). As the Utah Supreme Court held in Briggs v. Liddell: 
[A] court's equitable powers are narrowly bounded. "A court does not 
have carte blanche to reform any transaction to include terms that it 
believes are fair." 
Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770, 772 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added) (quoting Cunningham 
v. Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549, 552 (Utah 1984). In addition, "[although a court, sitting 
in equity, exercises discretion in granting or denying relief, it does not have the authority 
to ignore existing principles of law in favor of its view of the equities." Warner v. 
Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666, 670 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). 
In fact, there are only two narrow circumstances under which a court may 
reform the terms of a written contract: 
First, if the instrument does not embody the intentions of both parties to the 
contract, a mutual mistake has occurred, and reformation is appropriate. 
Second, if one party is laboring under a mistake about a contract term and 
that mistake either has been induced by the other party or is known by and 
conceded to by the other party, then the inequitable nature of the other 
party's conduct will have the same operable effect as a mistake, and 
reformation is permissible. 
Briggs, 699 P.2d at 772 (citing Thompson v. Smith, 620 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah 1980)); see 
also Guardian State Bank v. Stangl 778 P.2d 1, 5-6 (Utah 1989); Cunningham, 690 P.2d 
at 552 ("Reformation may be appropriate where both parties were mistaken as to a term 
of the contract, or where one party is mistaken and the other party is guilty of inequitable 
conduct, but it is not available to rewrite a contract to include terms never contemplated 
by the parties."); Bown v. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292, 295 (Utah 1984) ("the plaintiff must 
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show mutual mistake of the parties or mistake on the part of one and fraud or inequitable 
conduct on the part of the other, as a result of which the instrument reflects something 
neither party had intended or agreed to."); Ashworth v. Charlesworth, 231 P.2d 724, 727 
(Utah 1951) (same). 
Furthermore, "because courts are reluctant to change contractual obligations and 
rights . . ., the party seeking reformation must establish the mistake by clear and 
convincing proof that 'clinches what might otherwise be only probable to the mind.'" 
Briggs, 699 P.2d at 772 (quoting Greener v. Greener, 212 P.2d 194, 204 (Utah 1949) 
(citing Bown, 678 P.2d at 295) (emphasis added). 
Therefore, this Court should hold that the trial court erred to the extent it applied a 
"lack of clarity" standard for reforming the Leasehold Mortgage. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY REFORMED THE LEASEHOLD 
MORTGAGE. 
In addition, the trial court erred because it reformed the Leasehold Mortgage 
without meeting either of the above two circumstances where reformation is permitted. 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that Unilateral Mistake Did Not Occur. 
First, the trial court plainly rejected the notion that a "unilateral mistake" had 
occurred in this case sufficient to warrant reformation. The Court held: 
This is not a unilateral mistake situation. Even if it is viewed as such, Wolf 
did not engage in fraud nor remain silent after knowing of ASCU's 
"mistake." 
(Exh.Aatl9). 
18 
4829-3160-1159 1 
Likewise, ASCU has presented no evidence, nor has it even argued, that it had 
been mistaken as to the terms of the Leasehold Mortgage due to Wolf Mountain's fraud 
or with Wolf Mountain's silent knowledge. Accordingly, the only method by which the 
trial court could have reformed the Contract is by determining that the Contract as 
executed constituted a "mutual mistake" by both parties. 
B. ASCU Failed to Plead Mistake, Let Alone "With Particularity." 
However, in its Answer to the Complaint in this case, ASCU failed to plead 
"mutual mistake," or even "mistake," as an affirmative defense. (See R. 138-144). 
Under Rule 12(b)(5): "Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, 
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the 
responsive pleading thereto if one is required." UTAH R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) (emphasis 
added). In addition, under Rule 8(c): "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall 
set forth affirmatively . . . any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative 
defense." UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(c). Thus, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h), 
ASCU has waived "mistake" as an affirmative defense. See UTAH R. Civ. P. 12(h) ("A 
party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by answer or 
reply . . . .") (noting inapplicable exceptions); Mack v. UtahDept. of Commerce, 2009 
UT 47, <j 14, 221 P.3d 194 ("Normally, a party waives all defenses not raised in a 
responsive pleading, such as an answer or reply."). Under such circumstances, this Court 
"does not address" claims of mistake. The Cantamar, 2006 UT App at ^ 38 n.8 (noting 
that Rule 12(h) "deem[s] as waived almost all "defenses ... not presented either by motion 
or by answer or reply"). 
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Moreover, Rule 9(b) states: 
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or 
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated 
with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind 
of a person may be averred generally. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 9(b). The Supreme Court has mandated that parties follow this "plead 
with particularity" rule when they seek to prove reformation due to mistake. See Briggs, 
699 P.2d at 772 ("[Bjecause courts are reluctant to change contractual obligations and 
rights, the party seeking reformation must plead the circumstances constituting the 
mistake with particularity."); Mabey v. Kay Peterson Const Co., 682 P.2d 287, 289 (Utah 
1984) ("Rule 9(b) requires that in all averments of mistake, the circumstances 
constituting mistake shall be stated with particularity."). 
ASCU did not plead "mistake" at all, let alone with particularity. Thus, ASCU has 
waived any defense of a "mistake" to Wolf Mountain's claim for breach of the Leasehold 
Mortgage. 
C. ASCU Failed to Prove Mutual Mistake, Let Alone by Clear and Convincing 
Evidence. 
In addition, as set forth above, "because courts are reluctant to change contractual 
obligations and rights . .., the party seeking reformation must establish the mistake by 
clear and convincing proof that 'clinches what might otherwise be only probable to the 
mind/" Briggs, 699 P.2d at 772. 
However, in its memoranda regarding the parties' cross-motions for summary 
judgment, ASCU did not even argue that a "mutual mistake" had occurred, permitting 
reformation. (See R. 196-216, 272-294); see also Juricic v. Autozone, Inc., 2010 UT App 
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109, f 5 n.l, 232 P.3d 1088 (holding that affirmative defenses not raised before the trial 
court are waived on appeal). Therefore, ASCU plainly failed to prove "mutual mistake" 
by clear and convincing evidence. It did not even attempt to do so. 
D. The Trial Court Erred in Sua Sponte Holding that Mutual Mistake Had 
Occurred. 
Notwithstanding ASCU's failure to plead "mistake," its waiver of the right to do 
so, and its failure to even argue such in its summary judgment memoranda, in the trial 
court's Ruling and Order, the court declared sua sponte that, "to the extent that [it] is 
necessary to accomplish this type of reformation," it could hold that a form of "mutual 
mistake" had occurred in this case: 
The court concludes that there was not unilateral mistake here, but a 
mutual mistake, to the extent that is necessary to accomplish this type 
of reformation. The mistake was in not drafting in later drafts that "ee" 
was used rather than "or," that is, mortgagee rather than mortgagor. The 
fundamental agreement of the parties shows clearly their intent. This is not 
a traditional "mutual mistake" case but is what the court in StanglHI 
calls "a mistake in recordation or memorialization of an agreement...." 
(Exh. A at 18 (emphasis added)). 
1. Stangl Did Not Create a New Form of "Mutual Mistake." 
However, the Supreme Court in Stangl did not create a new form of "non-
traditional mutual mistake" based upon "mistakes in recordation or memorialization of an 
agreement." Instead, the Court there held: 
A few of our own opinions may have contributed to some 
misunderstanding of the law of mistake by stating without qualification that 
the law affords relief only for a mutual mistake. Indeed, this Court has, on 
occasion, declared that a unilateral mistake provides no basis for relief. 
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Stangl, 11% P.2d at 5. The Court went on to hold that unilateral mistake can be the basis 
for reformation when "the claiming party was mistaken as to its actual content and the 
other party, knowing of this mistake, kept silent [or] the claiming party was mistaken as 
to actual content because of fraudulent affirmative behavior." Id. at 6. 
As the trial court held in this case, however, 
This is not a unilateral mistake situation. Even if it is viewed as such, Wolf 
did not engage in fraud nor remain silent after knowing of ASCU's 
"mistake." 
(Exh. A at 19). Moreover, both before and after Stangl, the Supreme Court and this 
Court have reiterated the same standard for finding a mutual mistake: "A mutual mistake 
occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a misconception about a basic 
assumption or vital fact upon which they based their bargain." England v. Horbach, 944 
P.2d 340, 343 (Utah 1997); The Cantamar, LLC v. Champagne, 2006 UT App 3214 
38, 142 P.3d 140; Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666, 669 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
Robert Langston, Ltd. v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).x 
Ultimately, to reform an agreement based upon "mutual mistake," a party "must 
prove that the minds of both parties had been in agreement on a term which they mutually 
1
 Similarly, the Restatement of Contracts allows reformation by mutual mistake 
only where a party proves the identical intentions by both parties: 
[w]here both parties have an identical intention as to the terms to be 
embodied in a proposed written...contract...and a writing executed by them 
is materially at variance with that intention, either party can get a decree 
that the writing shall be reformed so that it shall express the intention of the 
parties, if innocent third persons will not be unfairly affected thereby. 
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §504 (1932). 
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failed to incorporate into writing." The Cantamar, 2006 UT App at % 38 n.9 (quoting 
Warner, 838 P.?d M ftM) ''citations and quotation :^  irk ^milfoil 
Sii ice ASCI I did i lot ai gi i€ tl u it nt inti lal i i listake occi in ed at all, the ti ial o : i it t 
S 0 Ugl l t t 0 c |0 s o o n | t s o w n ^ •|)asecj o n e v | c j e n c e t j i a t ASCU had presented. Crucially, 
however, neither the trial io--- u>v ASCU proved. K a-. .< - / L.«I > maim evidence, that 
V<- Mountain' s "i i lii id .... ;.** ^ in agreement" with *^ : ':-i (!u v ^ o : . 
F M !. shoi ild i efei to * ->* v-* • ' 
Mountain's. Instead, ASCU presented a single, unsworn declaration stating its 
contention as to what it believed was the true intention of the parties in drafting the 
Second Inception m o|»posilioii io ' \ null Mountain •> dllhl.A ih aittl I'udenu' \V l(,(»«it 
Exh. C; R. 218 at Exhs. 1-12). Notably, this was not an "affidavit" that the trial court 
was entitled to consider under Rule 56(c). See Utah R. Civ P. 56(c) (holding that in 
determining summary judgment, .;;*.;•... o \v\ examines sworn testimony, such as "the 
affidavits, il Mr ' = \ K ;\ - • • : . •-*•.•: . 
The trial coiirt's decision was particularly erroneous considering its 
acknowledgement that the DiK-oh-Saie (. laiise and :••- Sci ond Exception, which received 
(Exh A at 14). Both the parties and their attorneys had ample opportunity to review, 
reconsider, and revise the Second Exception before executing the Leasehold Mortgage. 
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2. The Trial Court Misapplied Summary Judgment Standards by 
Excluding Extrinsic Evidence Submitted by Wolf Mountain 
Evidence that Raised Genuine Issues of Material Fact. 
In addition, reformation due to mutual mistake "is not available to rewrite a 
contract to include terms never contemplated by the parties." Cunningham v. 
Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549, 552 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added). Furthermore, 
"[although a court, sitting in equity, exercises discretion in granting or denying relief, it 
does not have the authority to ignore existing principles of law in favor of its view of the 
equities." Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666, 670 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). 
In this case, the trial court examined several provisions of the Leasehold Mortgage 
and held that "the NATURE and PURPOSE of the document itself shows the true intent 
of the parties, despite the mistaken language." (Exh. A at 14 (emphasis in original)). In 
rendering its decision, however, the court excluded Wolf Mountain's affidavit evidence 
that raised genuine issues of material fact as to the meaning of the Due-On-Sale Clause 
and its Second Exception. (Exh. A at 20-21). Having excluded Wolf Mountain's 
evidence, it became a simple matter for the court to conclude that Wolf Mountain "has 
not demonstrated that there are specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial." (Exh. A at 21). This was improper. 
Pursuant to Rule 56(c): 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and 
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law... . 
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U rAi I R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added). A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the 
basis of the facts in the record, reasonable n linds could differ on whether a par!\" \ 
cc>{ idi ict i i teets the i eqi lired stai idai d See , It ickson v. Dabney, 645 I " 2d 613,615 (I Ital l 
1982). One sworn statement is sufficiei it to dispute avei n lei its oi I the othei side: :)f 
controversy aiid create an issue of fact, thus precluding summary judgment. See 
HolbrookCo. v. Adams, 542 I "' 2d 191, 193 ("1 It; tli 19' ; 5). 
It i additioi i, tl ic I Ital I Si iprei i le Coi u 11 las specifically 1 leld it lat vvi lere a pai (:> seeks 
to reform a written contract on the ground of mutual mistake, parol evidence should be 
considered to determine what the parties truly intended: 
I t is practically a universal rule that in suits to reform written 
instruments on the ground of fraud or mutual mistake, parol evidence is 
admissible to establish the fact of fraud or of a mistake and in what it 
consisted, and to show how the writing should be corrected in order to 
conform to the agreement or intention which the parties actually made 
or had, and this, even though the instrument in question is within the 
stati ite of On ml 
Janke v. Becksu >,< - : !' V 9 3 3 934 (I It; il I 1950) (qt i< )tii lg 15 \ t i t Ji i R efon i u i! i< > f 
Instruments § 113 (emphasis added)). Thus, both this Court and the Supreme Court have 
repeated the rule tl lat, ii I deten nining whether a "mi itual mistake" occurred, "[p]arol 
evi< i" * »• '-u -
Warner, 838 P.2d at 669 (citing Jensen v. Manila Corp. of the Church ojJesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints, 565 P.2d 63. 64 (I Jtah 1977)) 
In lliis i.i.' Ilinr i1, n,i .lispule IILII HI oppositioi i to 4.SC1 1" s cross-motioi i for 
summary judgment, Wolf Mountain submitted the sworn affidavit of Bradley R;nidt, 
Wolf Mountain's legal counsel who negotiated the Leasehold Mortgage. (R. 218 at Exh. 
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5). In addition, there is no dispute that Wolf Mountain also submitted, and Mr. Rauch's 
Affidavit testified regarding, the parties' Ground Lease Agreement, the parties' Second 
Amendment to Ground Lease Agreement, the parties' "SPA Agreement," Mr. Rauch's 
September 29, 2005 letter to ASCU, Mr. Rauch's November 17,2005 email to ASCU, 
various drafts of the Leasehold Mortgage, the parties' Reconveyance Agreement, Wolf 
Mountain's SITLA Lease, and the transcript of Mr. Rauch's July 25, 2009 deposition. 
(R.218atExhs. 1-4,6-12). 
However, in rendering its decision, the trial court stated that it did not consider any 
of the evidence that the parties presented outside of the Leasehold Mortgage itself: 
While the court has noted the concepts of mutual and unilateral mistake, the 
court has not based those comments on the extrinsic evidence provided by 
the parties in the form of their later declarations and affidavits, nor on the 
deposition testimony of Wolf s witness. . . . 
The court has not considered the extrinsic evidence offered by each party 
but has relied on the Leasehold Mortgage itself. 
(Exh. A at 20, 21). Under the "universal rule" identified in Janke and reiterated since, 
this was improper. In addition, this statement plainly makes the trial court's conclusion 
that Wolf Mountain "has not demonstrated that there are specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial" ring hollow. (Exh. A at 21). 
If this Court holds that ASCU failed to plead and/or prove "mutual mistake" by 
clear and convincing evidence, this Court need not address this argument. The Leasehold 
Mortgage remains unmarred, and should be enforced precisely as the parties wrote it. 
However, if this Court does not so determine, then it should remand this case to the trial 
court for consideration of the parties' extrinsic evidence regarding the meaning of the 
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Due-On-Sale Clause and its Second Exception. 
3. The Trial Court Particularly Erred in Declining to Consider 
Wolf Mountain's Extrinsic Evidence While Adopting ASCU's 
Extrinsic Evidence. 
Furthermore, altl 101 igh tl it: ti I a.! coi n t assei le cl tl lat it \v as oi ily coi isidei ii i„g tl le 
Leasehold Mortgage itself ilot the extrinsic evidence provided by either party - the 
court in reality rendered its decision based lareclv ~~ extrinsic evidence, including 
e
x
"-
:
 nrc provided solely In AS( 7 ' I'hr I MI despiU1 llu* (ail llutl (In mil 
sworn statement that ASCU cited in support of its cross-motion for summary judgment 
was the deposition testimony of Wolf Mountain's inunv- • In addition, ihc tm; .m!'! :M 
so despi • ' .N: . . uiuice was contradicux \\- \i . .MHUII s.iiiui-.ui i-1 
other extrinsic evidence that W olf IV loi n itaii I si lbn litted 
*i Wolf Mountain Disputed ASCU \s Assertion t >f* Wolf 
Mountain \ Status as a Tenant loide> Pan of the Ground 
Lease. 
For exnnipli llu Irnil MM iilrnlified ^e\enil I ed'oiinU Mniigage provision^ that 
it held only make sense if the Leasehold Mortgage were reformed. 
First, the Second Exception to the Due-On-Sale Clause states that it is not an 
" e v e : ' • ' : • .: 
(ii) any transfer of all or substantially all of Mortgagee's rights in and to llu 
development currently known as !he (1an\mis (including, without 
limitation, all of Mortgagee's interest as tenant under the Ground Lease aiid 
the Mortgaged Estate) whether effected hv stock or asset sale, provided that 
such transfer shall be expressly subject to each and every one of the liens, 
rights and interests of the Mortgagee under this Ixasehold Mortgage 
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(Exh. B at 1| 4.A). Regarding this provision, ASCU asserted that the term 
"Mortgagee" was really intended to mean "ASCU," the Morgagor, because ASCU 
was the only person referred to under the Ground Lease as a "tenant." (R. 209-
210). 
Following ASCU's direction, the trial court held: 
[I]t is clear from that entire exception that the assets are defined as 
belonging to mortgagor, ASCU. Further the transfer discusses the 
mortgagee as the tenant under the Ground Lease. While Wolf argues it 
maintains the status as tenant under some provisions of various documents, 
it is clear that Wolf is not the tenant under the Ground Lease but 
ASCU is the tenant under the Ground Lease. 
(Ex. A at 16 (emphasis added)). Thus, in its Ruling and Order, the trial court admitted 
that it rendering the decision, it had examined the Ground Lease (and/or ASCU's 
extrinsic evidence regarding such) and determined that Wolf Mountain was not a "tenant" 
under the Ground Lease. (See id). However, the Ground Lease is plainly "extrinsic" to 
the Leasehold Mortgage. Thus, the trial court was incorrect when it stated, in its Ruling: 
"The court has not considered the extrinsic evidence offered by each party but has relied 
on the Leasehold Mortgage itself." (Exh. A at 21). 
In addition, Wolf Mountain disputed this assertion by ASCU via citations to the 
Ground Lease and ASCU's own admissions. First, Wolf Mountain pointed out ASCU's 
admission in its statement of facts that: "One of the tracts of land governed by the 
Ground Lease was the so-called "Section 2," which Wolf Mountain leased from the State 
of Utah through its School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (the 'SITLA 
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Lease" ; . vlv- iyoJ- lims> ASCU admitted that ii i the Ground Lease, W olf Mountain w as 
designated as a i n h i n f as if 'he SITLA I case. (Id). 
Furthermore, in response to ASCI J's Statement of I ;acts, \V olf IV lounta in stated: 
Response to ASCU's 111: Disputed that W olf Mountain was not a '"""tenant" " 
of certain real property included in the Ground Lease. As set forth in §1.02 
and Exhibit A to the Ground Lease, Wolf Mountain acted as "tenant' 
regarding certain real property defined as the "Leased I atid," which it 
subleased to ASCU. (See Ground Lease Agreement dated Jiil\ 3, 1997 at 
S 1.02 and Exh \ ) . 
(R. 221). 1 1 lis evidence ft n tl ic: t: dei i IOI istrates tl iat., at a i i iii iin ti n i i, tl lere is a gei n iii i.e issi ic 
of material fact as to whether Wolf Mountain is a tenant under the Ground Lease for 
purposes of the description in the Second Exception to the Due-On-Sale Clause in the 
1 .easel lolcl fv lot tgage. 
b. Wolf Mountain Disputed ASCU's Assertion Regarding The 
Meaning of the "Mortgaged Estate. " 
Furthermore, in rendering its Ruling and Order, the trial coiirt, adopting A S C U ' s 
ai g;i in i; lei it, 1: lelcl: 
In addition, Wolf has no interest in the Mortgaged Estate as that term is 
defined in the Leasehold Mortgage. "Mortgaged Esta te" means ASCU s 
interest in the SITI,A, lease. W o l f s counsel in deposition admitted that 
was the reasonable meaning of "Mortgaged Estate." 
(Exl ii \ at 15 (en lpl n isis added)) 
However, the trial comt s own statement concedes that it considered extrinsic 
evidence - i.e., a port ion of the deposition, of Wolf Mounta in ' s counsel, (See id,). On 
si in n i i..ai ] ' ji idgi t i.e t: it. the ti ial c :>"i n t; cai n lot pick ai id cl loose 1 \ 1: licl I extrinsic evidence it 
will consider. 
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Moreover, the trial court's above finding was disputed by facts both admitted by 
ASCU and further presented by Wolf Mountain. In its statement of facts, ASCU 
acknowledged that "Mortgaged Estate," as defined in the Leasehold Mortgage, is the land 
subject to the SITLA Lease - not "ASCU's interest in the SITLA lease." (R. 202). In 
addition, Wolf Mountain presented evidence that it owns the majority of the land 
surrounding the SITLA Lease. (R. 218 at Exh. 5 at f 4 and Exh. 1). 
Furthermore, Wolf Mountain provided significant evidence that the Second 
Exception provides protection for Wolf Mountain because it owns "rights in and to the 
development currently known as The Canyons." (Exh. B at «| 4.A). Such rights include 
the right to receive four percent of the gross sales and lodging revenues earned by The 
Canyons, eleven percent (11%) of the construction costs of land developed at The 
Canyons, and additional lump-sum payments based on The Canyons' achievement of 
certain levels of paid skier visits. (R. 218 at Exh. 5 at f l ; R. 218 at Exh. 1 at §§ 3.01, 
25.01,25.04). 
In reality, it cannot seriously be argued that Wolf Mountain has "no interest in the 
Mortgaged Estate." Wolf Mountain insisted on the Leasehold Mortgage because it had 
such an interest. At a minimum, the evidence admitted or submitted by both parties, 
especially when viewed in a light most favorable to Wolf Mountain, raises genuine issues 
of material fact as to whether Wolf Mountain has an interest in the Mortgaged Estate. 
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c. Wolf Mountain Disputed ASCU's Assertion Regarding Wolf 
Mountain's Ownership of "Stock. " 
Next, the trial court, adopting A S C U ' s argument, M - ' *Hf ^ V ^ M ^ i m ; . * ha / o 
"stock. " ; ii: id tl n 1 : c -oi il< J i M : >t 1 lave been ei ititled to I lenef its i indei 1:1: ic Secoi id Exceptioi i 
I he trial court wrote : "As a limited liability [Wolf Mountain] ow ns no stock oi course" 
(Exli. A ai 1 i-l .rid later. " W o l f a- :i lin-i rd liabi'ii - of course has no stock. . ." (id. at 15). 
However, this finding is directly dispute- • : * ; : a l l ium s. \ . ,u 
si ated i 1'C t oi ila ' tl lat tl lis pi o\ isioi i vv as ii itei ided to pi otect VV oil: N lot n itaii L bi it also tt lat: 
"Membership interests in a limited liability company such as Wolf Mountain are 
commonly referred to as 'capital stock' or ' s tock "' ^ ° 18 nt Exh 5 at €T ?), THe trin1 
ecu ii t igi lored tl lis e v idei ice <;i1 ' 1 leii - kn \ ed ii i a ligl ible 
there is at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the beneficiary in the 
Second Exception is truly Wol f Mountain, just as the parties explicitly agreed. 
d. Wolf Mountain Disputed ASCU's Assertion Regarding Wolf 
Mountain's Interests Under the Talisker Sale Agreement. 
Finally, the district court opined that its rul ing was equitable because "the transfer 
[of A S C U assets to Tal isker] was expressly subject to each and ;rl > -PlK rights md 
decision, the trial court examined not jus t the terms o f the Leasehold Mortgage, but also 
the Talisker Sale Agreement. (See id.). Thus, once again, the trial court selectively 
examined extrii isic ev idence to support its determinations but ignored tl le opposing 
evidiiii.ee si ibn ill 1 ed b;; > W olf I loi u itaii i Foi exai t lple ii l ii s dispi ited facts, VV olf 
Mountain states: 
" " » 1 
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Section 9.16 of the Talisker Sale Agreement contains only the buyers' 
acknowledgement of such obligations and does not comply with the first 
exception to the Due-on-Sale clause which permits a sale to a third party if 
the obligations are taken on and provide a mechanism for Wolf Mountain's 
enforcement of such liens, rights, and interests. 
(R. 239-240). Specifically, Section 9.16 of the Talisker Sale Agreement states: 
9.16. Leasehold Mortgage. The Buyers acknowledge that pursuant to that 
certain Leasehold Mortgage by and between [ASCU], as mortgagor, and 
Wolf, as mortgagee, dated as of November 23, 2005 (the "Leasehold 
Mortgage"), the transfer of title to Buyer is subject to each and every one of 
the liens, rights and interests of Wolf under the Leasehold Mortgage and 
each and every one of the liens, rights and interests of Wolf under the 
Leasehold Mortgage shall survive Closing. 
(R. 196 at Exh. E at § 9.16.) Thus, Wolf Mountain presented evidence that Talisker's 
mere acknowledgement of the Leasehold Mortgage places Wolf Mountain in a weaker 
position than it was in with ASCU and denies Wolf Mountain the benefit of its bargain. 
When viewed in a light most favorable to Wolf Mountain, genuine issues of material 
facts exist as to whether Wolf Mountain's interests are adequately protected. 
4. The Second Exception Does Not Give Wolf Mountain a 
"Unilateral Right to Terminate" the Leasehold Mortgage. 
The trial court seemed most troubled by ASCU's argument that if the Second 
Exception were interpreted on its plain terms as executed by the parties, such 
would allow Wolf to default in some fashion, then foreclose the mortgage 
as the defaulting party or accelerate the benefits due to Wolf from ASCU 
under the mortgage. That is an absurdity and grants Wolf the right to 
absolutely and arbitrarily terminate the contract. That is a construction that 
is to be avoided under Utah law. 
(Exh. A at 14). However, the trial court's review of the Due-On-Sale Clause was 
erroneous, viewing a part of the Second Exception while forgetting the main portion of 
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the Due-On-Sale Clause itself. I nai Clause dues not provide that Wolf Mountain could 
cause sell its interests aiid then cause ASCU to default. Instead, the fourth provision of 
tlii i.mse (the ->nU nn»\ jsion at issue) states: 
A ^the following shall be an event of default ("Event ui Dciauu ;. . 
(iv) any sale, transfer, conveyance or assignment .-t a;: <•- .i-
 : pi>nioi •.>•' 
any interest in, the Mortgaged Estate, or the sale, transfer, conveyance or 
assignment of any controlling ownership interest in and to the 
Mortgagor [ASCU] (which shall not include transfer of controlling 
ownership interest in the Mortgagor's parent or shareholders). 
(Exh. B at!"[ 4.A.) (emphasis added). I he Second Exception (the only exception at issue) 
then states that the foregoing is n. -j .IM : \,. nl of default when \f h Wo]f Mountain's 
interest in r^; * u \--.r • . *-,. *... o thai ' : --: 
(ii) any tiaiisiui ui all or substantially all of Mortgagee's [Wolf Mountain's] 
rights in and to the development currently known as The Canyons 
(including, without limitation, all of Mortgagee's interest as tenant under 
the Ground Lease and the Mortgaged Estate) whether effected by stock or 
asset sale, provided that such transfer shall be expressly subject to each and 
every one of the liens, rights and interests of the Mortgagee under this 
Leasehold Mortgage. 
(Id). Thus, default w ill be triggered by the sale of either (1) any interest in the 
Mortgaged Estate or (2) a controlling interest in ASCI J, unless such involves the transfer 
of c i II of V /ir()ll *N loi u itaii it's i igl its ii i I he Canyons. Even it I hypothetically s K ' c Ii 
Mountain's interest in the Mortgaged Estate were sold, the Second Exception makes such 
not a default. However, the only trigger at issue in this case is the sale of ASCU, ASCU 
cannol cutde tik. plain term., nl Ilk 1 >(ic I >n Sail ( Liusc b> specula!i\c ^tivlchc. ol what 
nni'lil happen in In pntheliral i in innstamvs 
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Moreover, as set forth above, even if the Due-On-Sale Clause appeared odd or 
unfair - which it should not - such is never the basis for reformation. See Briggs, 699 
P.2d at 772 ("A court does not have carte blanche to reform any transaction to include 
terms that it believes are fair.") (quoting Cunningham, 690 P.2d at 552); Warner, 838 
P.2d at 670 ("Although a court, sitting in equity, exercises discretion in granting or 
denying relief, it does not have the authority to ignore existing principles of law in favor 
of its view of the equities.") (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
E. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Strictly Construe the Due-
On-Sale Clause. 
In addition, throughout its activities in examining the Leasehold Mortgage, the 
trial court failed to adhere to the terms of the Due-On-Sale Clause itself. Near its 
conclusion, that Clause specifically states that "[t]he terms of this Paragraph A. shall 
be strictly construed." (Exh. B at <[ 4.A) (emphasis added). There is no evidence that 
the parties did not fully and fairly negotiate this provision, nor were they unsophisticated 
or unrepresented parties. This provision put all parties on notice that they should 
carefully review and construe that Paragraph. This is the exact Paragraph that Wolf 
Mountain seeks to enforce, but the trial court nevertheless chose to reform to state 
something entirely different than the wording as the parties executed it. A strict 
construction does not permit the "reformed" construction adopted by the trial court, 
particularly in light of the trial court's holding that the Leasehold Mortgage was 
unambiguous. (See Exh. A at 12). 
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Particularly in light of the trial court 's assertion that it was "examining] the entire 
document" and construing it "on its face," (Exh. \ -it H 1 ^  tS~ "-;nl court's faih ire to 
strictly construe the very Due-Oi l-Sale Clai ise tl it it dei r it n: ids si icl: i ecu isti: i icti :)i i > ? l i i • 
revi'i^ihli' nTot 
In summary, the trial ccmil reformed the Second Exception without adhering to tlle 
law of reformation, finding neither "iinilateral mistake nor "miltu^I nu^iakc. . M ' d 
not even plead "i i listake" i:t i its \:i lswei let aloi: le > \ itl i pai tici ilaritj ' , and cei tail it; ' lid i lot 
prove such by "clear and convincing evidence." Instead of strictly construing the Due-
On-Sale Clause, a- IKII Clau-< requires, V mean exactly v"hit it savs. the trial court went 
0 1 i t i * r ; ••. . ;• , . :» . • *..• -. i > . - • - - " ; • •. • • - > :' d ; i \ i t ' i a n d 
other evidence presented by W olf Mountain. By reforming the Second Exception, the 
trial court overstepped its equitable bounds and vitiated the Due-on-Sale clause by 
redefining what constituted a:i 1 E\ ent of Defai ill: li 1 si 101: 1: the trial court's change denied 
V Vic i intaii I till le Ibei lei it of ill: s bargain ^ vitl i ' VSCI I. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision granting summary 
judgment in favor of ASCU and dismissing Wolf Mountain's Complaint. 
IV. IN THE A L T E R N A T I V E , IF THIS C O U R T DETERMINES SUA SPONTE 
THAT THE LEASEHOLD MORTGAGE IS AMBIGUOUS, THEN THIS 
CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT TO REVIEW 
THE PARTIES' EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
As set forth above, in its Ruling and Order, tl le trial court held that the Leasehold 
Mortgage was :t: lot ai i: ibigi IC >i is (Exl i V t: it 12) Botl i pai ties 1 ia\ e agreed that tl ic: 
Leasehold Mortgage is unambiguous. (R. 184-188, 291 292). Wolf Mountain has not 
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appealed the trial court's ruling that the Leasehold Mortgage is unambiguous because it 
believes that it truly is so - the trial court simply reformed it by an incorrect legal 
standard and improper selective review of extrinsic evidence. (R. 184-188). In addition, 
ASCU has asserted that the Leasehold Mortgage is unambiguous and has not filed a 
cross-appeal in this case. (R. 291-292). Therefore, the trial court's holding that the 
Leasehold Mortgage is unambiguous is not at issue in this appeal. 
However, in the alternative, if this Court determines sua sponte that the Leasehold 
Mortgage is ambiguous, then this Court should remand this case to the trial court for 
consideration of all of the extrinsic evidence presented by the parties, including the sworn 
affidavit of Bradley Rauch, Wolf Mountain's legal counsel who negotiated the Leasehold 
Mortgage. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision 
denying Wolf Mountain's Motion for Summary Judgment and ASCU's Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment and hold that (1) the trial court improperly reformed the Leasehold 
Mortgage and (2) the Talisker Purchase constituted an "event of default" under the 
Leasehold Mortgage. In the alternative, Wolf Mountain requests that this Court reverse 
the trial court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of ASCU and remand this 
case to the trial court to consider the parties' extrinsic evidence regarding the meaning of 
the Leasehold Mortgage's Due-On-Sale Clause, including its Second Exception. 
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REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Wolf Mouritaiii hereby requests oral argument regarding this Appeal because it 
Wi l l ma l . 
)ATK1> tin'-' 20lh dav VL August, 2010. 
KIRTON.v McCONKIE 
David M. Wahlquist 
Rod N. Andreason 
Ryan B. Frazier 
Attorneys for Appeiuun 
Resorts, L.C. 
;/;//,'/ h :),- .fountain 
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[ ] EXPRESS 
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[ ] HAND DELIVERY 
[ ] FAX 
[X ] E-MAIL 
John R. Lund 
Kara L. Pettit 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Telephone: 801-521-9000 
John P. Ashton 
Clark K. Taylor 
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
36 South State Street, Suite 1900 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0340 
Telephone: 801-532-3333 
2EaL 
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EXHIBIT A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, LC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ASC UTAH INC; GENERAL ELECTRIC 
CAPITAL COMPANY; ENOCH RICHARD 
SMITH, as personal 
representative of the ESTATE OF 
ENOCH SMITH, JR; CULP 
CONSTRUCTION CO; RICHARD BRANDE 
DRYWALL INC; DESIGN TEAM, INC; 
and STF ELECTRICAL SERVICES 
INC, 
Defendants. 
The above matter came before the court on March 22, 2010 for 
oral argument on summary judgment motions of the parties. 
Plaintiff was present through Rod N. Andreason and defendant 
ASCU was present through John R. Lund and Kara L. Pettit. 
Wolf filed a motion for partial summary judgment on December 
9, 2009. ASCU filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment 
and an opposition to Wolf's motion on December 21, 2009. Wolf 
filed a reply in support of its motion and an opposition to 
ASCU's motion on February 10, 2010. ASCU filed a request to 
submit February 10, 2010, asserting no response had been filed, 
obviously "crossing in the mail" with Wolf's response. Based 
thereon the court set oral argument. ASCU then filed a reply on 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 07050485 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: March 26, 2010 
March 8, 2010, after obtaining an extension from the court to 
March 4, 2010. 
Oral argument was held and the court took the issues under 
advisement. Before the hearing the court carefully considered the 
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. Since 
taking the issues under advisement, the court has further 
considered the law and facts relating to the issues. Now being 
fully advised, the court renders the following Ruling and Order. 
CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
ARGUMENTS 
The background of this case is set forth in this court's 
Ruling and Order of September 5, 2008, wherein the court 
considered ASCU's motion to dismiss concerning this provision of 
the agreements between the parties. 
In this motion by Wolf, Wolf argues that the sale of ASCU 
stock to Talisker is an event of default under the leasehold 
mortgage. 
As claimed undisputed facts Wolf argues that it and ASCU 
executed a leasehold mortgage on November 23, 2005. Under that, 
para 4A, the sale or transfer of any controlling ownership 
interest in and to ASCU is defined as an event of default, the 
-2-
Due on Sale Clause. It entitled Wolf to bring an action to 
foreclose the mortgage and ASCU was to pay all fees and costs 
thereof. On July 15, 2007, ASCU sold its controlling interest to 
Talisker Canyons Finance Co and Talisker Corp. 
From these facts Wolf argues that Wolf is entitled to 
foreclose because of this event of default. 
ASCU also moves for summary judgment arguing there is an 
exception to the Due on Sale Clause for the circumstances of this 
case, as discussed by this court in its earlier ruling of 
September 5, 2008. 
Factually, ASCU argues that the leasehold mortgage states 
the interest of Wolf to the mortgaged estate is subject to the 
terms of that leasehold mortgage and the matters of record. One 
of the tracts of land under the 1997 Ground Lease was Section 2, 
which Wolf leased from the State of Utah, the SITLA Lease. ASCU 
became the tenant under the SITLA Lease under the July 1, 1998 
lease between ASCU and SITLA. The Second Amendment to the Ground 
Lease allows Wolf to develop units on this Section 2 and ASCU 
grants Wolf a mortgage to secure its obligation to present Wolf 
fee simple bitle to the land in Red Pine Village if and when ASCU 
receives all approvals. That concluded with this Leasehold 
Mortgage on November 23, 2005. Attorneys for both parties 
negotiated the terms. The Ground Lease provides ASCU with the 
-3-
ability to sell its assets without that being a default and ASCU 
wanted to retain that ability. The second exception to the 
Leasehold Mortgage was negotiated and provides that ASCU can 
transfer its controlling interest, subject to Wolf's liens, 
rights and interests under the Leasehold Mortgage. The 
negotiated terms are not precisely reflected in the final 
Leasehold Mortgage. Read literally it wold allow the Mortgagee 
(Wolf) to transfer its rights. It is clear that the intent was 
for the interests of ASCU to be transferred subject to Wolf's 
interests, not the other way around. The term Mortgagor was used 
in defining "substantially all" of the assets as used in the 
mortgage. Wolf has no capital stock as a limited liability 
company and ASCU does have capital stock, further clarifying the 
intent of the parties in this provision. ASCU is the tenant under 
the SITLA lease. The sale of ASCU was in the form of outstanding 
capital stock from ASC to Talisker Canyons. It binds Talisker to 
each of the rights and liens and interests of Wolf under the 
Leasehold Mortgage. 
Wolf alleges in its complaint that the transfer of stock 
entitled Wolf to foreclose on the mortgage and become tenant 
under the SITLA lease. The second exception modifies the 
mortgage so the sale of stock is not an event of default. The 
literal language is nonsensical as the word Mortgagee in the 
first two phrases of 4A(ii) is an error and the only reasonable 
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construction is that the second exception applies to the transfer 
of ASCU's rights, not the transfer of Wolf's interests. The 
court is to avoid an unreasonable interpretation. If the sale of 
ASCU's stock is an event of default creating an exception to the 
sale of Wolf's stock (there is no Wolf stock) makes no sense. 
Wolf had no interest in the rights to development that Wolf could 
transfer, only ASCU had such rights. Wolf has no interest as 
tenant, only ASCU has such tenant rights. It makes even less 
sense to say Wolf's transfer of rights is subject to Wolf's 
rights. But, making an exception for ASCU does make sense. 
Moreover, the extrinsic evidence shows without real dispute 
that such was the intent of the parties. ASCU did not want to 
have less than the Ground Lease gave them and this would do so as 
interpreted by Wolf. 
The Talisker sale specifically indicates that now Talisker 
is subject to the liens, rights and interests of Wolf under the 
mortgage, further evidencing that such an interpretation makes 
sense. 
In opposition and reply Wolf argues that the claimed 
exception is not ambiguous on its face and thus there can be no 
extrinsic evidence. The Mortgage states that Wolf, as mortgagee, 
can transfer its rights without triggering the Due On Sale 
clause. It is sensible that Wolf can sell its interests without 
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triggering the Due On Sale clause. Wolf's counsel so testified. 
ASCU's position would render the rule (Due on Sale) meaningless 
and the exception would consume the rule and would leave Wolf 
powerless to invoke the Due on Sale clause. 
Wolf disputes some of the facts ASCU asserts. Wolf claims 
that others besides counsel were involved in the negotiations 
over the mortgage. Wolf disputes the course of negotiations and 
asserts the provision at issue was meant to say what it says and 
was meant to preserve to Wolf some right to sell Wolf's interests 
without negating the mortgage. Wolf disputes some conversations 
between the parties. In short Wolf claims that the current 
provision was just what Wolf wanted, and is not an error, and 
that the discussions between the parties show that, though the 
positions are in dispute. 
Wolf asserts that ASCU does not challenge that the sale 
would violate the mortgage but for the second exception. That is 
not ambiguous and does not protect ASCU as ASCU argues it does. 
In reply ASCU argues the Wolf's position cannot prevail. 
The due-on-sale provision at issue has two exceptions. The 
second exception is clearly an error and should be reformed to 
apply to the transfer of mortgagor/ASCU' s rights in certain 
circumstances, and not to the transfer of Wolf/mortgagee's 
interests. If read literally it would require Wolf to demonstrate 
-6-
its own default. 
The interpretation Wolf seeks makes no sense for several 
reasons: 
(1) a transfer by Wolf of any of its interest cannot create 
a default. Under the definitions a transfer by Wolf is not a 
default. The due on sale provision sets out two circumstances 
where there is an event of default; sale of all the mortgaged 
estate of ASCU or sale of controlling ownership interest of ASCU. 
These clearly apply to ASCU's actions, but Wolf argues the 
exceptions are that Wolf cannot transfer Wolf's interests in the 
Mortgaged Estate. The purpose of a due on sale provision is 
intended to protect the interests of the mortgagee (Wolf) by 
conditioning the ability of the mortgagor (ASCU) to sell or 
otherwise transfer the real estate subject to the mortgage. 
The remedies section of the Leasehold Mortgage, which 
provides relief for Wolf, and if read as Wolf claims would allow 
Wolf to default, then foreclose the mortgage as the defaulting 
party or accelerate the benefits due under the mortgage. That is 
an absurdity and thus the court can reform it. 
(2) Wolf has no interest in the mortgaged estate because the 
mortgage defines ''mortgaged estate'' as ASCU's interest in the 
SITLA lease. Wolf's counsel admitted that was the meaning of 
mortgaged estate. 
Further, Wolf's rights under the reconveyance agreement are 
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not what Wolf claims if ASCU defaults. That agreement allows 
Wolf the option to purchase from ASCU at fair value the assets 
and property subject to the reconveyance agreement. The SITLA 
lease does not allow Wolf to take over ASCU's tenancy or 
development rights in the SITLA property. 
(3) Wolf has no interest in the Canyons under the second 
exception. Read as Wolf contends, a default by Wolf would 
entitle Wolf to its rights under the Ground Lease. Wolf has no 
tenancy interests under the Ground lease or the mortgaged estate. 
(4) Wolf's reading ignores parts of the second exception. 
It defines "substantially all" as being substantially all of the 
assets of ASCU, not Wolf. The court so recognized in its 
September 2008 ruling. 
(5) Wolf's construction also conflicts with its counsel's 
affidavit as to the intent of this language. 
This affidavit of counsel cannot create a factual dispute as 
it is inconsistent with his deposition, wherein he stated a 
different interpretation of this provision. Further, the 
affidavit is evidence only of Wolf's subjective intent. It is 
not a fact but a conclusion. Mutual assent is to be judged and 
determined by overt acts and not subjective or hidden intent of 
the parties. That intent was never expressed to ASCU. 
ASCU's construction does not render the second exception 
meaningless and overwhelm or render meaningless the due on sale 
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provision. The second exception means that the due on sale 
provision is triggered by a transfer of controlling interest only 
if the transfer is subject to each and all of the rights and 
interest of Wolf. Any transfer that does not protect Wolf's 
interests in the 100 units of Red Pine is still a default. 
Talisker is bound by each of the liens and rights and interests 
of Wolf, under 9.16 of the Sales Agreement. 
The court's prior ruling indicated a dismissal was not 
required as the document was not so facially unambiguous to 
warrant dismissal. ASCU has provided the extrinsic evidence 
needed to show a transfer of the stock was not an event of 
default. Wolf's proffered explanation is not plausible or 
reasonable in view of the language used. 
DISCUSSION 
There are cross motions for summary judgment in this case. 
Plaintiff bears the burden of proof on its sole claim in the 
complaint, that Wolf is entitled to foreclose. Wolf seeks 
judgment on that claim. ASCU seeks through its motion to dismiss 
the claim. 
Thus, on Wolf's motion for summary judgment, it has the 
affirmative duty to provide the court with facts that demonstrate 
both that the Wolf is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and 
that there are no material issues of fact that would require 
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resolution at trial. 
On ASCU's motion, ASCU as the moving party without the 
burden of proof at trial, must show there is no genuine issue of 
material fact. Upon such a showing, Wolf then as the nonmoving 
party but the party bearing the burden of proof at trial, must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. Orvis v. Johnson, 177 P.3d 600 (UT 2008). 
Where there are cross motions for summary judgment, the 
court need not necessarily grant one or the other. Amjacks 
Investment v. Design Assoc, 635 P.2d 53 (UT 1981). 
The parties claims are such that this case is indeed a 
difficult question for the court. ASCU argues that its motion is 
not really a request for reformation, but asserts the request is 
for a type of reformation. ASCU then argues the court can 
examine the entirety of the document and find the meaning clear, 
that it means just as ASCU claims it means. Wolf, on the other 
hand, argues this is a pure reformation case and ASCU cannot show 
the elements needed for reformation and the contract as written 
entitled Wolf to summary judgment. 
The court interprets this contract in accord with Utah law. 
Whether this contract is an integrated contract is a 
question of fact. Even though there appears to be no integration 
clause, the court finds and concludes that neither party has 
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generated a legitimate factual dispute that this contract was not 
meant to be a final and complete expression of their bargain. It 
is thus an integrated contract. Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 
2008 UT 20. 
Thus, extrinsic evidence is admissible only if the contract 
is the result of a forgery, lacks consideration, or is voidable 
for fraud, duress, mistake, or illegality, or if there is 
ambiguity. See Tangren. 
Then the court examines the agreement to determine if it is 
ambiguous. Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51. In Daines the court 
discussed Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass's, 907 P.2d 264 (UT 
1995). Of course there may be facial ambiguity or ambiguity with 
regard to the intent of the contracting parties. The court must 
first make a legal determination whether there is facial 
ambiguity before turning to extrinsic evidence. To determine 
facial ambiguity, the court may consider extrinsic evidence which 
is relevant because otherwise the determination is based on the 
judge's own experience. Moreover, the judge must ensure that 
"the interpretations contended for are reasonably supported by 
the language of the contract," (Emphasis added). The court may 
not, however, consider circumstances to create ambiguity where 
the language of the contract would not otherwise permit. A 
finding of facial ambiguity, if extrinsic evidence is examined, 
must be "reasonably supported by the language of the contract." 
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(Emphasis added). 
Courts are to "endeavor to construct contracts so as not to 
grant one of the parties an absolute and arbitrary right to 
terminate a contract, [citation omitted] In addition, we 
interpret the terms of a contract in light of the reasonable 
expectations of the parties, looking to the agreement as a whole 
and to the circumstances, nature and purpose of the contract." 
[citations omitted]. Moreover, where there is a doubt about the 
interpretation of a contract, a fair and equitable result will be 
preferred over a harsh and unreasonable one. And an 
interpretation that will produce an inequitable result will be 
adopted only where the contract is so expressly and unequivocally 
so provides that there is no other reasonable interpretation to 
be given it." Peirce v. Peirce, 994 P.2d 193 (UT 2000). 
Taking these basic principles int consideration, and 
recognizing that the court in September 2008 indicated this 
agreement "appeared to be" ambiguous. (Ruling and Order, p. 8), 
the court now finds and concludes, based on the face of the 
document, that it is not ambiguous. It is not ambiguous for 
several reasons. As noted, the court looks at the language of the 
contract, what it is attempting to accomplish and the nature of 
the agreement and its purpose. 
First, as the court examines the entire document and its 
purpose and intent, it is a leasehold mortgage which gives the 
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mortgagee (Wolf) rights if the mortgagor (ASCU) defaults. The 
default at issue here is whether ASCU sold its stock or assets. 
It did beyond dispute. That is an event of default, unless one 
of the exceptions applies. On its face, the document then 
attempts to create an exception to that Due on Sale clause. That 
exception is where the issues of this case arrive. ASCU claims 
that this is simply a "typo" or scrivener's error where 
"mortgagee" was mistakenly written when "mortgagor" should have 
been written. If the document did not have those errors, it 
would certainly be unambiguous, ASCU claims. The court agrees. 
The court examines all of the contract, not just the 
disputed portions. The remainder of the contract language leaves 
NO DOUBT, on its face, apart from the "mortgagee" -"mortgagor" 
conflict, v/hat was intended. This was intended to secure Wolf 
against defaults by ASCU, and to protect ASCU from a foreclosure 
unless it made a transfer that did not protect Wolf's rights and 
interests. 
Being too simplistic, to illustrate the court's thoughts on 
the matter, an analogy to a promissory note is helpful to the 
court. The simple and straightforward purpose of a promissory 
note is for a lender to lend money and the borrower to repay it 
under certain conditions. Thus, if that note stated "Lender 
shall lend to borrower the sum of $1,000. Lender agrees to repay 
borrower that sum plus 10% simple interest by June 1, 2011" that 
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note's language would obviously be in error. It is the borrower 
who will repay the lender, not the lender who repays the 
borrower. Whether that is called a mutual mistake, unilateral 
mistake, or anything else, the NATURE and PURPOSE of the document 
itself shows the true intent of the parties, despite the mistaken 
language. 
This document is, of course, much more complex and it was a 
negotiated result. The defaults possible by ASCU are defined by 
ASCU's actions, not the actions of Wolf. Wolf transferring its 
assets, and as a limited liability it owns no stock of course) 
cannot be a default under such a Leasehold Mortgage. A Due on 
Sale clause, of course, is designed to protect the interests of 
the mortgagee (Wolf) by giving the mortgagee a remedy if the 
mortgagor transfers its interests. Thus, the entire purpose of 
the entire document on its face is clear. 
Further, the remedies section of the Leasehold Mortgage 
provides relief for Wolf as mortgagee. If read as Wolf argues, 
the remedies section would allow Wolf to default in some fashion, 
then foreclose the mortgage as the defaulting party or accelerate 
the benefits due to Wolf from ASCU under the mortgage. That is an 
absurdity and grants Wolf the right to absolutely and arbitrarily 
terminate the contract. See Peirce v. Peirce. That is a 
construction that is to be avoided under Utah law. 
In addition, Wolf has no interest in the Mortgaged Estate as 
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that term is defined in the Leasehold Mortgage. "Mortgaged 
Estate" means ASCU's interest in the SITLA lease. Wolf's 
counsel in deposition admitted that was the reasonable meaning of 
"Mortgaged Estate." 
Wolf's reading, which it claims the court should adopt, 
ignores parts of the second exception. It defines "substantially 
all" as being substantially all of the assets of ASCU, not Wolf. 
It also, again, defines that "substantially all" as being stock 
or assets. Wolf as a limited liability of course has no stock 
but ASCU as a corporation does have stock. 
Section 4(A)(iv) the Leasehold Mortgage defines the 
following as an event of default: 
(iv) . . . the sale, transfer, conveyance or assignment 
of any controlling ownership interest in and to the 
Mortgagor (which shall not include transfer of 
controlling ownership interest in the Mortgagor's 
[ASCU] parent or shareholders). . . 
This section explicitly excepts the following from actions that 
constitute an event of default: 
[E]xcept for . . . (ii) any transfer of all or 
substantially all of Mortgagee's [Wolf's] rights in and 
to the development currently known as The Canyons 
(including without limitation, all of Mortgagee's 
[Wolf s] interest as tenant under the Ground Lease and 
the Mortgaged Estate) whether effected by stock or 
asset sale, provided that such transfer shall be 
expressly subject to each and every one of the liens, 
rights and interests of the Mortgagee [Wolf] under this 
Leasehold Mortgage. For purposes of the foregoing 
sentence "substantially all" shall include all of the 
assets held by Mortgagor [ASCU] which are necessary for 
unimpeded operation and development of the Canyons 
resort as it currently exists or may be improved. The 
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terms of this Paragraph A shall be strictly construed, 
and if any collateral assignment hereunder does not 
include the specific language of agreement and 
acknowledgment in favor of Mortgagee [Wolf] as required 
under this paragraph, such collateral assignment shall 
be null and void. 
The court has inserted the brackets [ ] indicating ASCU or 
Wolf for clarity. In the lease Wolf and ASCU are not, of 
course, set forth in this provision other than by reference 
to mortgagee or mortgagor. Thus, it is clear from that 
entire exception that the assets are defined as belonging to 
mortgagor, ASCU. Further, the transfer discusses the 
mortgagee as the tenant under the Ground Lease. While Wolf 
argues it maintains the status as tenant under some 
provisions of various documents, it is clear that Wolf is 
not the tenant under the Ground Lease but ASCU is the tenant 
under the Ground Lease. Given that provision alone, the 
court can discern the intent of the parties that ASCU, as 
mortgagor, may transfer its assets without being in default 
but only if Wolf's rights are preserved. 
The court thus determines that the document is not ambiguous 
on its face, it intended that ASCU be in default upon sale but 
not if Wolf's interests and rights were protected. 
The court does not believe it is indeed involved in a 
reformation as that concept is normally meant. The court finds 
and concludes, FROM THE ENTIRELY OF THE CONTRACT ON ITS FACE, 
that such was intended and the error of placing "ee" rather than 
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"or" was the product of confusion or a scrivener's error. 
Whether this error is couched in terms of mistake and 
reformation or simply couched in terms of clarity of the contract 
with a minor typographical error the result is the same to the 
court. 
Where the contract as written expresses an unintended 
meaning or creates an uncontemplated right, equity provides that 
it can be made to conform to the parties intent. There is no 
evidence from the document itself that Wolf would have the right 
to default and claim any rights. 
Wolf argues in terms of the elements of reformation and 
asserts they are lacking, by reference to the extrinsic evidence 
as well. The court recognizes that perhaps this is a type of 
reformation, as ASCU argued, but it is in equity simply stating 
the contract as the document itself clearly intended. The court 
is NOT considering the extrinsic evidence of the parties, but 
merely reading the agreement as the parties obviously intended 
from the nature of the agreement itself. 
There was indeed a mistake here, and that mistake was that 
each party twice left in the document the word "mortgagee" and 
did not note that it should have stated "mortgagor" right after 
4A(ii) (any transfer of all or substantially all of Mortgagee's 
rights . . . ., all of Mortgagee's interest as tenant . . .). 
Both of those instances should have stated "mortgagor" to 
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accomplish what the rest of the document and agreement most 
certainly and clearly intended. It is just as if in a promissory 
note the lender agreed to repay the borrower. 
As stated by the court in Guardian State Bank v. Stangl III, 
778 P.2d 1 (UT 1989), "Whether a mistake is a mutual mistake or a 
unilateral mistake may have significance, but it is not true, as 
is sometimes stated, that the law affords a remedy only for a 
mutual mistake of fact but not for a unilateral mistake of fact." 
The court concludes there was not a unilateral mistake here, 
but a mutual mistake, to the extent that is necessary to 
accomplish this type of reformation. The mistake was in not 
noting in later drafts that "ee" was used rather than "or, " that 
is, mortgagee rather than mortgagor. The fundamental agreement of 
the parties shows clearly their intent. This is not a 
traditional "mutual mistake" case but is what the court in Stangl 
III calls "a mistake in recordation or memorialization of an 
agreement . . . " The court stated that such "may not be 
exploited by one party to take advantage of the other. 
Principles of common honesty are not foreign to law and equity." 
As noted in that case, even apart from an incorrect 
memorialization, if a unilateral mistake of fact is the basis of 
the agreement, a court may still afford relief. Here, however, 
this was not a unilateral mistake on the part of ASCU. Stangl III 
was later said to stand for the proposition that if a contract as 
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written does not conform to what both parties intended, 
reformation or rescission is available where either a mutual or 
unilateral mistake occurred in the memorialization of the 
agreement. Neiderhauser Builders v. Campbell, 824 P.12d 1193, 
1197 (UT App 1992) . 
This is not a unilateral mistake situation. Even if it is 
viewed as such, Wolf did not engage in fraud nor remain silent 
after knowing of ASCU's "mistake." The agreement as written 
simply failed to state the agreement of the parties AS EVIDENCED 
BY THE AGREEMENT ITSELF in all other phrases and clauses. Some 
type of equitable reformation is thus allowed and required. 
Wolf argues that each party has later, with respect to this 
motion, sought to demonstrate a contrary intent. That is true, 
each party has attempted by later declarations to reconstruct the 
negotiations and show that their position is supported by that 
background. 
Of course the court cannot weigh the credibility of the 
claims of the parties in their later affidavits. Each party 
claims, now many years after the agreement, to have intended a 
certain thing. ASCU claims, of course, that it intended as they 
argue for. Wolf claims Wolf intended the agreement to read just 
as it reads. It is certainly clear that the court cannot and it 
does not weigh the credibility of those affidavits. In fact, the 
court does not consider them. 
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The court, as noted, FROM THE DOCUMENT ITSELF, because as a 
legal matter there is no facial ambiguity, makes the 
determinations it has made. The court has not relied on the 
extrinsic evidence but on the language in the document and the 
nature of the agreement and its purposes. 
While the court has noted the concepts of mutual and 
unilateral mistake, the court has not based those comments on the 
extrinsic evidence provided by the parties in the form of their 
later declarations and affidavits, nor on the deposition 
testimony of Wolf's witness. The court rules that because there 
is no ambiguity on the face of the document except as created by 
a scrivener's error, and it created not ambiguity but lack of 
clarity, the court need not and does not consider extrinsic 
evidence. The mistake made is again ascertained from the 
document itself, not from extrinsic evidence. Thus, while the 
court is entitled to examine extrinsic evidence if there is a 
mistake, the court does not need to in this case and has not and 
does not consider the evidence provided by way of deposition or 
affidavits of the "drafters" or others. Neither party's 
extrinsic evidence is considered in this ruling. 
There is no ambiguity in what the parties intended, and that 
is that ASCU was not in default for the sale of all or 
substantially all of its assets, stock or otherwise, because the 
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transfer was expressly subject to each and all of the rights and 
interests of Wolf under the Leasehold Mortgage. The later 
transfer documents between ASCU and Talisker show that as well. 
Thus, Wolf has not succeeded in demonstrating both that Wolf 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that there are no 
material issues of fact. There are no issues of fact for trial 
but Wolf has not shown as a matter of law that it is entitled to 
judgment. The facts are undisputed about the sale and the content 
of the language of the agreement. 
On ASCU's motion, ASCU has as the moving party without the 
burden of proof at trial, shown there is no genuine issue of 
material fact for trial. Wolf then as the nonmoving party but 
the party bearing the burden of proof at trial has not 
demonstrated that there are specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial. 
The court has not considered the extrinsic evidence offered 
by each party but has relied on the Leasehold Mortgage itself. 
Wolf's claim for foreclosure is thus dismissed on summary 
judgment. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
-21-
order is required. 
DATED this day of , 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE1 
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EXHIBIT B 
When Recorded, Return To: 
Bradley E. Rauch 
Hirsch & Westheimer, P.C. 
700 Louisiana, 25th Floor 
Houston, Texas 77002-2728 
L E A S E H O L D M O R T G A G E 
THIS LEASEHOLD M O R T G A G E ("Mortgage") is made as of November £ 5 , 2005 by 
A S C Utah, Inc., a Maine corporation, whose address is 4000 The Canyons Resort Drive, Park 
City, Utah 84098 ("Mortgagor"), in favor of Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company ("Mortgagee"), 
1. Mortgaged Estate. 
For good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, 
Mortgagor hereby irrevocably and unconditionally grants, transfers, assigns, conveys, warrants, 
mortgages, and assigns to Mortgagee, subject only to the terms and conditions of this Mortgage 
and those matters of record referenced on Exhibit A attached hereto, all of Mortgagor 's right, 
title and interest in and to that certain Amenueu and Restated Lease Agreement Number 419, by 
and between the State of Utah, School and institutional Trust Lands Administration, as landlord, 
and Mortgagor, as tenant, dated July 1, 1998, as amended (the "Lease") as evidenced by that 
Notice of Lease, dated December 11, 2 0 0 1 , and recorded on December 12, 2001 , as Entry No . 
605787, in Book 1419, beginning at Page 419, with the Summit County, Utah Recorder with 
respect to the real property located in Summit County, Utah and more particularly described on 
Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof (such mortgaged interest being hereinafter 
referred to as the "Mortgaged Estate"). 
2« Secured Obligation. 
This Mortgage is given solely for the purpose of securing Mortgagor 's obligation set 
forth in Article 12 of the Second Amendment to Ground Lease Agreement ("Second 
Amendment") , dated November 12, 1999, by and between Mortgagor, as tenant, and Mortgagee, 
as landlord to: 
(i) grant to Mortgagee by warranty deed fee simple title to the land on which Mortgagor 
has obtained approval from Summit County for the 100 Units (as defined in the Second 
Amendment) , free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, except for (A) the Village 
Management Agreement for the Canyons Resort Village recorded on December 15, 1999 as 
Entry N o . 555285 in Book 1300 at Page 1 of the Official Records of Summit County, as 
amended (however, it being understood and agreed that by accepting such interest the same shall 
not constitute a ratification, affirmation, consent or agreement to the enforceability of any of 
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such amendments against Mortgagee); (B) the Development Agreement for The Canyons 
Specially Planned Area, recorded July 28, 1998 as Entry No. 513500 in Book 1168 at Page 82 of 
the Official Records of Summit County; and (C) an Amended and Restated Development 
Agreement for The Canyons Specially Planned Area, recorded November 24, 1999 as Entry No. 
553911 in Book 1297 at page 405 of the Official Records, as amended (however, it being 
understood and agreed that accepting any interest shall not constitute a ratification, affirmation, 
consent or agreement to the enforceability of any 6F sucK amendments against Mortgagee); and 
provide to Mortgagee, at Mortgagor's sole cost and expense, water rights, exchange rights, 
certificates, prepaid connections and entitlement to immediate connection to a then currently 
operating water system for the 100 Units; 
(ii) deliver to Mortgagee, at Mortgagor's sole cost and expense, the final recorded plat for 
the 100 Units, including, without limitation, all related permits, approvals, all planning, 
engineering, design and architecture associated therewith; 
(iii) to the extent provided in the development approvals and supporting materials 
submitted by Mortgagor to and approved by Summit County provide to Mortgagee, at 
Mortgagor's sole cost and expense, roads and utilities to the boundary(s) of the lot(s) on which 
the 100 Units are located, including, without limitation, the design, engineering, approval, 
surveying, permitting and construction by Mortgagor of all roads, medians, pavement, drainage 
ditches, sidewalks, culverts, retaining walls, pedestrian or recreation tunnels directional and 
informational signs, street lights; utilitv lines, including wires, cables, conduits, pipes, mains, 
poles, guys, anchors, fixtures, supports and terminals, repeaters, pumps, pressure reduction 
valves, and such other appurtenances of every nature and description including without 
limitation those for water, electricity, telecommunications, gas, sanitary sewer, septic, and 
drainage that will connect the Lower Village Base Area up the mountain whatever distance to the 
boundaries of the 100 Units; 
(all of the foregoing being hereinafter collectively, the "Secured Obligation"). The Secured 
Obligation shall include the grant by Mortgagor to Mortgagee of any easements, rights of way 
and licenses required for access, development and construction of the 100 Units. 
3. Rights and Duties of the Parties. 
A. Mortgagor shall comply with the terms and conditions of this Mortgage 
and the Lease and perform its obligations hereunder and thereunder. 
B. Mortgagor shall appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting 
to affect the security hereof, the title to the Mortgaged Estate, or the rights or powers of 
Mortgagee; and should Mortgagee elect to also appear in or defend any such action or 
proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evidence of title and attorneys' fees 
in a reasonable sum incurred by Mortgagee. 
C. Mortgagor shall pay: (i) at least ten days before delinquency all taxes and 
assessments affecting the Mortgaged Estate, including all assessments upon water company 
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stock, if any, and all rents, assessments and charges for water, appurtenant to or used in 
connection with the Mortgaged Estate; (ii) when due, all encumbrances, charges, and liens with 
interest, on the Mortgaged Estate or any part thereof, which at any time appear to be prior or 
superior hereto; and (iii) all costs, fees, and expenses of this Mortgage. 
D. Should Mortgagor rail to make any payment or to do any act required by 
this Mortgage, then Mortgagee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand 
upon Mortgagor and without releasing Mortgagor from any obligation hereof, may: (i) make or 
do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may deem necessary to protect the 
security hereof, Mortgagee being authorized to enter upon the Leased Premises for such 
purposes; commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the 
security hereof or the rights of powers of Mortgagee; (ii) pay, purchase, contest, or compromise 
any encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior 
hereto; and (iii) in exercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in 
its absolute discretion it may deem necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title and 
legal counsel. 
4. Default and Remedies. 
A. Any of the following shall be an event of default ("Event of Default"): (i) 
Mortgagor's failure to comply with the requirements of the Secured Obligation, which failure 
has not been resolved or remedied completely within sixty (60) days after the Mortgagee gives 
written notice thereof to Mortgagor or (ii) Mortgagor's failure to perform or observe any other 
covenant or agreement contained in this Mortgage, and such failure shall remain uncured for a 
period of sixty (60) days after written notice thereof; or (iii) if (a) Mortgagor then having the title 
to the leasehold estate created by that certain Ground Lease Agreement dated as of July 3, 1997, 
between Mortgagee, as landlord, and Mortgagor, as tenant, as amended ("Ground Lease"), while 
having such title be adjudicated a bankrupt or adjudged to be insolvent; (b) a receive or trustee 
shall be appointed for the aforesaid Mortgagor's property and affairs; (c) the aforesaid 
Mortgagor shall make an assignment for the benefit of creditors or shall file a petition in 
bankruptcy or insolvency or for reorganization or shall make application for the appointment of a 
receiver; of (d) any execution or attachment shall be issued against the aforesaid Mortgagor or 
any of the aforesaid Mortgagor's property, whereby the Mortgaged Estate or any building or 
buildings or any improvements thereon shall be taken or occupied or attempted to be taken or 
occupied by someone other than the aforesaid Mortgagor, except as may be otherwise permitted 
under the terms of the Ground Lease, and such adjudication, appointment, assignment, petition, 
execution or attachment shall not be set aside, vacated, discharged or bonded within ninety (90) 
days after the issuance of the same; or (iv) any sale, transfer, conveyance or assignment of all or 
any portion of, or any interest in, the Mortgaged Estate, or the sale, transfer, conveyance or 
assignment of any controlling ownership interest in and to the Mortgagor (which shall not 
include transfer of controlling ownership interest in the Mortgagor's parent or shareholders), 
except for (i) any collateral assignment of the Mortgaged Estate to a bona fide third party lender 
for consideration provided that such collateral assignment specifically provides for the benefit of 
the Mortgagee that the rights acquired under such collateral assignment shall be subject to (A) 
each and every one of the covenants, conditions and restrictions set forth in the Ground Lease, 
including, without limitation, the obligation to pay Rent on the Leased Premises as provided in 
Article III of the Ground Lease, and pay Mortgagee the Option Payments for development of the 
Leased Premises as provided in Article XXV of the Ground Lease, and to construct the 
infrastructure as provided herein in Paragraph 2(iii) above, and to acknowledge and agree for the 
benefit of the Mortgagee that the rights under the Ground Lease are subject to reconveyance 
obligations (described below) and'to any and all other lights and inteiests of the Mortgagee, as 
landlord, provided in the Ground L'easefnone of which covenants, conditions or restrictions shall 
be deemed to be waived by Mortgagee, as landlord, by reason of the right given to so grant a 
collateral assignment of the Mortgaged Estate and (B) each and every one of the liens, rights and 
interests of the Mortgagee under this Leasehold Mortgage and (ii) any transfer of all or 
substantially all of Mortgagee's rights in and to the development currently known as The 
Canyons (including, without limitation, all of Mortgagee's interest as tenant under the Ground 
Lease and the Mortgaged Estate) whether effected by stock or asset sale, provided that such 
transfer shall be expressly subject to each and every one of the liens, rights and interests of the 
Mortgagee under this Leasehold Mortgage. For purposes of the foregoing sentence, 
"substantially all" shall include all of the assets held by Mortgagor which are necessary for 
unimpeded operation and development of The Canyons resort as it currently exists or may be 
improved. The terms of this Paragraph A. shall be strictly construed, and if any collateral 
assignment hereunder does not include the specific language of agreement and acknowledgement 
in favor of Mortgagee required by this paragraph, such collateral assignment shall be null and 
void. 
The parties agree that the reconveyance rights mentioned above shall be those set 
forth in that certain Reconveyance Agreement between Mortgagor and Mortgagee dated July 2, 
1997, as the same may be amended from time to time in the future, except that as to any 
collateral assignee that may acquire the Mortgaged Estate the Reconveyance Agreement shall not 
expire as otherwise provided in Section 11 thereof, but shall only terminate upon the full 
performance of the Secured Obligations above, and that notwithstanding the provisions of 
Section 3 thereof, no consideration shall be paid for such reconveyance of the Mortgaged Estate. 
B. In each such Event of Default, with or without foreclosure, the Mortgagee 
shall have the immediate right to receive and collect all rents, income and profits from the 
Mortgaged Estate whether then due or accrued or to become due without liability for any loss 
which may arise uncollectible rents so long as the Mortgagee acts with ordinary prudence, and 
all rents income and profits are hereby assigned to the Mortgagee absolutely and not as security 
for so long as this mortgage remains in effect, provided that the Mortgagor may collect the rents, 
income and profits so long as there is no Event of Default then existing. The Mortgagee may, in 
the sole discretion of the Mortgagee, foreclose this mortgage either by civil action, with the 
immediate right to the appointment of a receiver on ex parte order without bond and with the 
power to collect all rents, income and profits or enter into or terminate leases and otherwise 
manage and operate the mortgaged property pending foreclosure. Any foreclosure sale shall not 
impair or affect the lien of this mortgage on any portion of the Mortgaged Estate remaining or 
any other remedy of the Mortgagee for the recovery of the Secured Obligation. Out of the 
proceeds of any foreclosure sale, the Mortgagee may deduct all costs and expenses of any 
remedy pursued, including attorneys' fees, and may pay and discharge any lien on the Mortgaged ^ / 
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Estate, either prior or junior to this mortgage, and retain or be awarded all sums necessary to 
repay advances authorized hereunder and to satisfy the Secured Obligation. This Mortgage shall 
not prevent nor be deemed to prevent the Mortgagee from pursuing any remedy whatsoever that 
Mortgagee may have against the Mortgagor for the collection or enforcement of the Secured 
Obligation, and the Mortgagee may at its option pursue any other course, successively or 
concurrently, to coliect or enforce such Secured Obligation and may resort fte) any'other assets of 
the Mortgagor without first resorting to, and without prejudice to the right to'later resort to the 
mortgaged property pursuant to this mortgage. 
C. At any time after an Event of Default, Mortgagee may, in addition to the 
rights and remedies set forth in Ground Lease, bring an action in any court of competent 
jurisdiction to foreclose this Mortgage or to enforce any of the covenants hereof. 
D. The remedies listed herein are illustrative only and Mortgagee shall also 
have any and all other rights in law or equity, whatever they may be. No remedy herein 
conferred upon or reserved to Mortgagee is intended to be exclusive of any other remedy herein 
or by law provided or permitted, but each shall be cumulative and shall be in addition to every 
other remedy given hereunder or now or hereafter existing at law or in equity or by statute. 
E. Any failure by Mortgagee to insist, or any election by Mortgagee not to 
insist, upon strict performance by Mortgagor of any of the terms, provisions or conditions of this 
Mortgage shall not be deemed to be a waiver of same or of any other term, provision or 
condition thereof, and Mortgagee shall have the right at any time or times thereafter to insist 
upon strict performance by Mortgagor of any and all of such terms, provisions and conditions. 
F. In the event that Mortgagee incurs any expenses (including reasonable 
attorneys' fees whether or not the attorney is a salaried employee of Mortgagee and court costs) 
to collect and enforce Mortgagor's obligations hereunder, Mortgagor shall, upon demand by 
Mortgagee, immediately reimburse Mortgagee therefor, from the date incurred by Mortgagee, 
including, without limitation, reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in any litigation, bankruptcy, 
insolvency, administrative and arbitration proceedings and appeals therefrom. 
5. Proceeds from Condemnation or Destruction. 
Should the Mortgaged Estate or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any 
public improvement or condemnation proceeding, or damaged by fire, or carthqualcc, or in any 
other manner, Mortgagee shall be entitled to all compensation, awards, and other payments or 
relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option to commence, appear in and prosecute in its own 
name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compromise or settlement, in connection with 
such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rights of action and proceeds, 
including the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting the Mortgaged Estate, 
are hereby assigned to Mortgagee, who may, after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including 
attorneys' fees, apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Mortgagor agrees to 
execute such further assignments of any compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and 
proceeds as Mortgagee may require. 
6. Further Assurances/Satisfaction. 
Mortgagee covenants to execute and deliver to Mortgagor any and all easements, licenses 
and plats necessary in conjunction with the 100 Units and required under the Development 
Agreement for The Canyons Specially Planned Area, recorded July 28, 1998 as Entry No. 
513500 in BQftk, J,l<?&#$nrPag$,82 of Official Records, as the same may be cunended. Mortgagee 
further covenants to release this Mortgage upon the full and complete satisfaction and discharge 
of the Secured Obligations. 
7, Miscellaneous Provisions. 
A. The rights accorded Mortgagee by this Mortgage are in addition to, and 
not in substitution or limitation of any right, remedy, power or authority of Mortgagee under any 
other agreement or under now existing or hereafter arising applicable law. By accepting this 
Mortgage, the Mortgagee does not in any way waive, release or relinquish any right, title or 
interest or claim thereto that the Mortgagee has or may assert in connection with the Mortgaged 
Estate. 
B. All obligations contained in this Mortgage are intended by the parties to 
be, and shall be construed as, covenants running with the land. 
C. This Mortgage shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties 
hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees, administrator^ executors, successors and assigns. The 
term "Mortgagee" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the Secured 
Obligation. In this Mortgage, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the 
feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
D. The interpretation, construction and enforcement of this Mortgage shall be 
governed by the laws of the State of Utah. 
E. Mortgagor and Mortgagee covenant and agree (a) upon the request of the 
other party, to furnish such further information as is reasonably required to document or perform 
their obligations under this Mortgage, and (b) to execute and deliver to each other such further 
documents and instruments, and to do such further acts and things, all as the other party may 
reasonably request for the purpose of carrying out the intent of, and obligations under, this 
Mortgage and the documents referred to in this Mortgage, 
F. The invalidity of any one or more covenants, phrases, clauses, sentences 
or paragraphs of this Mortgage shall not affect the remaining portions of this Mortgage or any 
part thereof, and this Mortgage shall be construed as if such invalid covenants, phrases, clauses, 
sentences or paragraphs, if any, had not been inserted herein. 
G. Time is of the essence under this Mortgage. 
H, Any notice required or permitted under this Mortgage shall be delivered in 
accordance with the notice provisions set forth in the Ground I^ase. 
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EXHIBIT A 
TO LEASEHOLD MORTGAGE 
(see attached) 
ASC0075509 
EXHIBITS 
TO LEASEHOLD MORTGAGE 
All of Section 2, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Mendian. 
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Mortgagor has executed this Leasehold Mortgage as of the date first written above. 
MORTGAGOR: 
ASC UtftfitJiM* ^Maine corporation 
PrintName:"^^r»-/iy V£,-f?f 
Title: yictfrraM^'t 
STATE OF 
COUNTY OF 
ss. 
Utah, Inc., a Maine 
The foregoing LEASEHOLD MORTGAGE was acknowledged before me this 
day of November, 2005, by W~r£> the /)<;</// 1^{I ^ A Q P Ufah T™ ' 
corporation. ^ i f r n o f ^ V t ^ V |jfc. 
My Commission Expires' 
&U- NOTARY PUBLIC Residing at: ^ J C^mUilM^ 
! \ < ^ COLLEEN THOMPSON 
# & S 2 S & NOTARY PUBLIC* STATE of UTAH] 
1996 EAST 6400 SOUTH STE120 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84121 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 08-02-2007 
fi 
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THE x 
CANYONS" 
PARK CITY. UTAH 
November 2.1; 2005 
Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C« 
c/o Hirsch & Westheimer, P.C. 
25th Floor NationsBank Center 
700 Louisiana 
Houston, Texas 77002-2728 
Attention; Bradley E. Rauch 
ASC Utah, Inc. 
Section 2/Second Amendment to Ground Lease Transaction 
Dear Michael and Kenny; 
ASC Utah, Inc. has simultaneously herewith executed and delivered to Wolf Mountain 
Resorts, L.C. that certain Leasehold Mortgage ("Mortgage") of even date herewith, covering that 
certain real property described on Exhibit UBM to the Mortgage. ASC Utah, Inc. and Wolf 
Mountain Resorts, L.C acknowledge and agree that ASC Utah, Inc/s execution and delivery of 
the Mortgage does not constitute a ratification, affirmation, consent or agreement of ASC Utah, 
Inc. to the matters set forth in Section 4(A)(iv)(i)(A) of the Mortgage. 
Please acknowledge the terms of this letter agreement by executing this letter agreement 
in the space provided below. 
Timothy Vetter 
Vice President of Community Affairs 
The Canyons 
ACKNOWLEDGED AND AGREED; 
Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C. 
By: 
Its: 
Print Name: 
Date: 
ASC0075512 
When Recorded Return To: 
Bradley E, Rauch 
Hirsch & Westheimer, P.Q 
700 Louisiana, 25th Floor 
Houston, Texas 77002-2728 
[PARCEL LD. # J 
CONSENT AND SUBORDINATION 
GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL CORPORATION, as Collateral Agent for the 
Lenders ("Beneficiary"), is the beneficiary under the following deeds of trusts encumbering 
certain real property more particularly described in Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by reference, in which ASC UTAH, INC., a Maine corporation ("Grantor") has a 
leasehold interest pursuant to that certain Amended and Restated Lease Agreement Number 419, 
by and between the State of Utah, School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration, as 
landlord, and Grantor, as tenant, dated July 1, 1998, as evidenced by that certain Memorandum 
of Lease recorded under Book 1419, Page 419 with the Summit County, Utah Recorder: 
1. First Lien Deed of Trust, Assignment of Leases, Rents and Revenues and 
Fixture Filing, dated November 24, 2004, by and between Grantor, 
Beneficiary and First American Title Insurance Company, as Trustee, 
recorded with the Summit County, Utah Recorder on November 24, 2004, 
as Entry No. 718022, in Book 1662, beginning at Page 889; and 
2. Second Lien Deed of Trust, Assignment of Leases, Rents and Revenues 
and Fixture Filing, dated November 24, 2004, by and between Grantor, 
Beneficiary and First American Title Insurance Company, as Trustee, 
recorded with the Summit County, Utah Recorder on November 24, 2004, 
as Entry No. 718023, in Book 1662, beginning at Page 958, 
(collectively, the "Deeds of Trusts 
In consideration of one dollar and otheT valuable consideration, Beneficiary hereby 
consents to that certain Leasehold Mortgage, dated November , 2005 by and between Wolf 
Mountain Resorts, L.C., a Utah limited liability company, as mortgagee, and ASC Utah, Inc. a 
Maine corporation, as mortgagor, to be recorded simultaneously herewith with the Summit 
County, Utah Recorder (the "Leasehold Mortgage"), and Beneficiary hereby subjects to and 
subordinates and shall remain in all respects and for all purposes subject, subordinate and junior 
to the lien of the Leasehold Mortgage, and to the rights and interests of the from time to time of 
754172,4 
the mortgagee under the Leasehold Mortgage, as fully and with the same effect as if the 
Leasehold Mortgage had been duly executed, acknowledged and recorded prior to the Deeds of 
Trust. 
The Deeds of Trust shall otherwise remain in full force and effect. 
[SIGNATURE BLOCK IS ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE] 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have caused this Consent and 
Subordination to be duly executed this 15th day of November, 2005. 
GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL 
CORPORATION, as Collateral Agent for 
the Lenders 
ennife*£llane 
frnr^-^ By:. 
Namq^fe i ^ 
Its: Duly Authorized Signatory 
STATE OF CLcx\«r<rr:cu^s~ 
COUNTY OF Ftf.r-t.yAck 
) 
: ss. 
) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 15th day of November, 
2005, by Jennifer Lane, the Duly Authorized Signatory of General Electric Capital Corporation. 
/ ^ ^ i C^y/MuA^ 
My Commission Expires: 
nh\ ion 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: Hoi ttcrrnrr <^*~^ M , ^ ^ , CTT^c ?ST! 
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EXHIBIT A 
TO 
CONSENT AND SUBORDINATION 
All of Section 2, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
LESS AND EXCEPTING THEREFROM: 
Beginning at the Northwest comer of Government Lot 12, Section 2, Township 1 South, 
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence Southwesterly to the Southwest comer of 
Section 2, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence Easterly 
along the South line of said Section 2, to the South Quarter comer of said Section 2; thence 
Easterly along the said South line of said Section 2 to the Southeast comer of said Section 2; 
thence Northerly along the East line of said Section 2 to the East Quarter comer of said 
Section 2; thence Northerly along the East line of Section 2 to the said Northwest comer of 
Government Lot 12, the point of beginning. 
4 
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When Recorded, Please Mail To; 
Bradley E. Ranch 
Hirsch & Westheimer P,C. 
700 Louisiana, 25* Floor 
Houston, Texas 77002-2728 
Please Mail Tax Notice to Grantee at: 
Tax Parcel Nos.: PP-75-H-6, PP-75-H-5, PP-75-J and 
PP-75-A-2. 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
For the sum of $10.00 and other good and valuable consideration, ASC UTAH, INC., a 
Maine corporation, Grantor, hereby conveys and warrants against all claiming by, through or 
under it to WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, L.C., a Utah limited liability company, Grantee, the 
following described tract of land in Summit County, State of Utah: 
See Exhibit A attached hereto 
and made a part hereof 
Subject only to all non-delinquent taxes and assessments, zoning and other governmental 
restrictions, those items listed in Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof and all matters 
that a physical inspection or accurate survey of the property would disclose. 
This Special Warranty Deed is executed by Grantor to be effective as of November / * / . 
2005. 
GRANTOR: 
ASC Utah, Inc. 
a Maine corporation 
Byr^^^-^r 
Title: ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " ^ 
mssiA. 
ASC0075517 
S'lAiliOl1' "i 1 &- ' x. ) 
)ss. 
COUN'l Y OFSi.ywrvi.A ) 
The .foregoing iiistrim^^ me this JH day of IJBL , 
" ~^"~ m.MUA'ti.^^of A SC"I J'tah, Inc. a I laine 2005, by^xi l^^ i^ i± t iSC 
corporation. 
My commission expires: 
Notary Public 
Address: 
_L: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
DANA W. KENT 
4000 The Canyons Resort Drive 
Park City, Utah 84098 
My Commission Expires 
January 9, 2008 
STATE OF UTAH 
74*957.4 
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EXHIBIT A 
TO 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
Real Property 
The property referenced in the foregoing instrument is located in Summit County, State of 
Utah, and is more particularly described as follows: 
Pgreelffl: 
The North 10 rods of the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of 
Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel #2: 
The South 10 rods of the North 20 rods of the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of the 
Southwest quarter of Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel #3: 
The South 10 rods of the North 30 rods of the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of the 
Southwest quarter of Section 36, Township I South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
PeraW 
The South 10 rods of the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of 
Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel #5: 
The South one-half of the Northwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of 
Section 36, Township I South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
ASC0075519 
llXIIiUil B 
TO 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
1 Taxes or assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the records of any taxing authority 
that levies taxes or assessments on real property or by the public records, 
2. Any facts, rights, interests or claims which are not shown by the public records but which could 
be ascertained by an inspection of said land or by making inquiry of persons in possession 
thereof, 
3. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary line, shortage in area, encroachments or any othei facte 
which a correct survey would disclose, and which arc not shown by the public records. 
Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in p atents or In acts authorizing the 
issuance thereof; water rights, claims, or title to water 
General property taxes for the year 2005 now due and payable, but will not become delinquent 
mtil November 30. Tax ID No. PP-75-H-6, PP-75-H-5, PP-75-J and PP-75-A-2. 
6. The property described herein is located within the boundaries of Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District, and is subject to any and all charges and assessments thereof. 
7. The property described herein is located within the boundaries of Snyderville Basil iVater 
Reclamation District, and is subject to any and all charges and assessments thereof. 
8 Fhe property described herein is located within the boundaries of Snyderville Basin Special 
Recreation District, and is subject to any and all charges and assessments thereof, 
9 Die property described herein is located within the boundaries of Summit Count) Spe cial Sei \ ice 
District No. 1, and is subject to any and all charges and assessments thereof. 
10, rhe property described herein is located within the bounds of Summit County Special Service 
District No. 7 and is subject to the charges as assessments thereof. 
II. I he property described herein is located within the bounds of Kimball Area Transportation 
Special Service District and is subject to the charges and assessments thereof* 
12. Subject to the rights of Weber Basin Water Conservancy District under any outstanding contract 
and/or agreement therein 
13. Notice of Easement Rights wherein Partnership Investments of Colorado, Inc. and Park West 
Water Association hereby give notice of certain easement rights for water collection, transmission 
and storage, recorded July 3, 1979 as Entry No. 157302 in Book M-136 at page 348 of Official 
Record. The exact location of any such easements are not disclosed, 
# 
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Park West Water Association relinquished all rights under said Notice of Easement Rights in that 
certain document recorded September 6, 1994 as Entry No. 414241 in Book 834 at page 777 of 
Official Records. 
14. Development Agreement for The Canyons Specially Planned Area, recorded July 28, 1998 as 
Entry No. 513500 in Book 1168 at Page 82 of Official Records, but deloting any covenant, 
conditions or restrictions indicating a preference, limitation or discrimination based upon race, 
color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status or national origin to the extent such covenants, 
conditions or restrictions violate 42 USC 3604 (c). 
An Ordinance Amending The Canyons SPA Rezone Ordinance and Development Agreement was 
recorded November 24, 1999 as Entry No. 553911 in Book 1297 at page 405 of the Official 
Records. 
An Amended and Restated Development Agreement for The Canyons Specially Planned Area, 
recorded November 24, 1999 as Entry No. 553911 in Book 1297 at page 405 of the Official 
Records. 
15. The limitations, covenants, conditions, restrictions, exceptions, easements, terms and liens 
contained within that certain Management Agreement for The Canyons Resort Village recorded 
December 15,1999 as Entry No. 555285 in Book 1300 at Page 1 of Official Records, but deleting 
any covenant, conditions or restrictions indicating a preference, limitation or discrimination based 
upon race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status or national origin, to the extent such 
covenants, conditions or restrictions violate 42 USC 3604 (c). 
First Amendment to the Management Agreement for The Canyons Resort Village, recorded 
December 17,1999 as Entry No. 555434 in Book 1300 at Page 668 of Official Records. 
Second Amendment to The Canyons Resort Village, recorded January 1!, 2000 as Entry No, 
556961 in Book 1303 at Page 296 of Official Records. 
Third Amendment to the Management Agreement for The Canyons Resort Village, recorded 
January 31,2000 as Entry No. 558232 in Book 1305 at Page 719 of Official Records. 
16. The effect, if any, of that certain Warranty Deed, recorded June 3, 2005 as Entry No. 738409 in 
Book 1705 at page 763 of Official Records; wherein Michael Baker and Wasatch Capital 
Corporation appear as Grantors and Tod Griswold, Trustee of the Griswold-Kim 2005 
Irrevocable Trust appears as Grantee. 
17. The effect, if any, of that certain Warranty Deed, recorded June 3, 2005 as Entry No. 738410 in 
Book 1705 at page 765 of Official Records; wherein Michael Baker and Wasatch Capital 
Corporation appear as Grantors and Greenwhich Holdings, L.C. appears as Grantee. 
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